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Securities - Rule 1 Ob-5 - Insider Fraud
Plaintiff-stockholders of Atlas Corporation (Atlas) sued, on behalf of
themselves and derivatively on behalf of the corporation, alleging a breach
of common law fiduciary duty and a violation of the anti-fraud provision,
Rule 1ob-5, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Pursuant to an
agreement by which Hughes Tool Company (Toolco) was to purchase
Atlas' common stock interest in Northeast Airlines, Inc., a proxy state-
ment was mailed by Atlas to its stockholders to obtain the necessary
approval for the sale. Stockholder approval was obtained and Atlas trans-
ferred its interest in Northeast Airlines, Inc. in consideration of $ 5,000,000.
Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy statements failed to disclose that Howard
R. Hughes, one of the defendants and sole shareholder of Toolco, domi-
nated Atlas' Board of Directors, that the sale was not negotiated at arms
length, and that inadequate consideration was received. Summary judg-
ment was originally granted for defendants in the District Court, and
plaintiffs moved for reargument. Held, granted: and upon reargument,
summary judgment for defendants denied. The shareholder who has a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a securi-
ties transaction by his corporation, may pursue his remedy under iob-5,
notwithstanding the fact that he is not a purchaser or seller of securities.
Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
Prior to the enactment of the general anti-fraud provisions of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, defrauded investors had
to rely on the remedies provided at common law' or the Blue Sky Laws
of the state. Recognizing the many difficulties of proof and procedure'
'See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) where the court followed the decisions of
Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904) and Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E.
232 (1903) in holding that "by reason of special facts [fraudulently concealed facts affecting the
value of the stock] a fiduciary duty between director and shareholder may exist." Contra, Tippe-
canoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1904) where it was held that no relationship of a fidu-
ciary nature exists between a director and a shareholder of a business corporation. See also, 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) [cited hereafter as Loss].
a Procedural advantages of the federal system over state common law actions include: exclusive
jurisdiction (when the actions are founded on the Exchange Act), broad venue provisions (along
with extraterritorial service of process), and no requirement of posting security expenses as in the
state action (McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961)). For the advantages
of the burden of proof in the federal system, see Loss 1435 where it is stated: "the fact is that
the courts have repeatedly said that the fraud provisions in the SEC acts . . . are not limited to
circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for deceit." See also, A. BROMBERG,
SECUasTEs LAW FRAUD: SEC RULE lob-5, [hereafter cited as BROMBERG], ch. 8 (McGraw-Hill
1967); Wettach, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5-A Federal Corporations Law?, 43 N. CAR. L.
REv. 637 (1965); Notes 18-29 infra.
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connected with common law fraud, Congress sought to provide a more
flexible cause of action for the protection of "those [investors] who do not
know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do."3 Against
this background there was enacted the 1933 Securities Act which provided,
inter alia, a remedy for defrauded purchasers of securities,' and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act which made unlawful fraudulent sales or pur-
chases by dealers in over-the-counter transactions. In addition, Section
10 (b) of the latter Act granted the Securities Exchange Commission the
rule making power necessary to prevent manipulative and deceptive de-
vices in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. However, there
was a "serious gap" in the anti-fraud scheme in that a purchaser of
securities could use fraudulent practices with complete immuity. As a
means of closing this "loophole," ' the Securities Exchange Commission in
1942 promulgated Rule lOb-5 pursuant to Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act.
Basically, Rule lob-5 prohibits use of interstate commerce, mails or facili-
ties of a national stock exchange8 to (1) employ any scheme to defraud,
(2) make any untrue statement or omit to state a material fact necessary
to make any statement made not misleading, or (3) do anything which
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person, in connection with the
sale or purchase of a security."l At first glance, the Rule might be viewed
as just another weapon in the SEC's arsenal." Such, however, is not the
case, because in 1946 implied civil liabilities under Rule lob-5 were recog-
'Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944).
'Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1964).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 15(c) [now S 15(c)(1)], 48 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. S
780(c)(1) (1964).
0See, Loss 1426 where it is stated: "Even after the 1938 amendments, however, there was still
nothing in the acts or rules which covered fraud in the purchase of securities by persons other
than over-the-counter brokers and dealers. This was a serious gap, because an issuer itself, or an
officer or director or principal stockholder, could buy in its securities by fraudulent practices
without being touched by federal authority ....
'SEC Release No. 3230 (21 May 1942) stated that there was a "loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying
securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." See generally, Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or
Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 505, 514 (1953); Comment, Securities Regulation: Shareholder Derivative Actions
Against Insiders Under Rule lOb-5, 1966 DUKE L.J. 166.
"[U]se of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . ." may be incidental to the fraudulent transaction
according to Loss at 1519-28. See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960)
(interstate telephone calls made before fraudulent transaction, which was itself entirely intrastate
was sufficient for "instrumentality of interstate commerce.") and Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. Il. 1963) (intrastate telephone call closely related to interstate commerce.)
"[T]o ue or employ any manipulative or deceptive devise . . ." is not defined by Sec. 10(b)
or section Ob-5. Questions have arisen as to the interrelation of these three subsections of rule
lob-5. Compare, Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (1). Del. 1951) where the sub-
sections were held to be "mutually supporting," wit/ Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) where the court stressed the differences in the nature of suits
brought under the three subsections.
°"fl~n connection with a sale or purchase. was a strict requirement of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); however, this paper will later show that the
instant case of Entel v. Allen has placed some doubt on the necessity of such a requirement.
"The 1933 and 1934 acts are not "self executing" to the extent that they do not specifically
provide a private right of action, Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (sth
Cir. 1960).
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nized by the judiciary. 2 Thus, purchasers" and sellers," as well as the
Commission, can now initiate suit under 1ob-5.
Since the hurdle of implied liabilities, the courts have gradually watered-
down the elements of proof under lob-5 as compared with the restrictive
elements associated with common law fraud." But even so, some elements
of common law deceit'--false or omitted representations of material fact
which were relied upon by plaintiff to his detriment, defendant having
cognizance of the falsity (scienter) -have been carried over to fraud
under lob-5. The presence of some type of fraudulent scheme or device
by the buyer or seller of securities is essential, whether it be in the form
of an affirmative misrepresentation,'" half-truth" or non-disclosure." In
addition, the Second Circuit in List v. Fashion Park1 held that the elements
of materiality and reliance must be proved by the plaintiff seeking his
' Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) involved a con-
spiracy between defendants and a third company to which the defendants had sold the bulk of
the corporate assets pursuant to an agreement made prior to their purchase of plaintiff's stock.
The court reasoned that "under any reasonably liberal construction, these provisions [Section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5] apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation
from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position, which
would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction." The court found a
private right of action based on implication and founded in basic tort law. See also, Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951) which held that "the rule is clear"
that a cause of action lies against an insider under rule lob-5; accord, Reed v. Riddle Airlines,
266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); contra, Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1948). There can be no doubt as to the validity of Kardon since the doctrine has been ap-
proved and adopted in six circuits, e.g., Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th
Cir. 1965); Texas Con. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Also, the doctrine has been adopted by other circuits by way
of dictum, e.g., Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961); Beury v. Beury,
222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955).
"3See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) where buyers were treated the same
as sellers giving them the same unrestricted remedy, "no reason being shown why Congress should
have intended to treat them differently." Contra, Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp.
123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
'
4 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica, 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) where it was held that
1ob-5 gives a private right of action for civil iability for violation of the statute and the injured
parties were not left to their common law remedies when defrauded in selling their shares.
'See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Loss stated that the elements of
common law deceit has itself been "considerably softened." For a thorough discussion in specific
areas of the elements of proof under lOb-5 as compared to common law fraud, see, Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CH1. L. R. 824 (1964); Comment, Civil
Liability Unler Section lOB & Rule I0b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity,
74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965); Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-fraud
Rule lob-5, 63 MEcH. L. REv. 1070 (1965). This paper will discuss the elements only in skelton
form, see, notes 17-28 infra and accompanying text.
16 See Loss at 1431 for a summary comparison of common law fraud and fraud under the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.
s7 See generally, BROMBERG, supra note 2.
s Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
'See, e.g., Texas Con. Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co.. 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
" See, e.g.. Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Meisel
v. New Jersey Trust, 218 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) where the court stated, "[T]he
kind of 'fraud or deceit' reached by the Rule is that which induces the purchase by plaintiff...."
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) went so far as to require defendant to
atnticipate what will mislead a plaintiff. See also In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961) and Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Ritter. 371 F.2d 14S (10th Cir. 1967) which are
the leading cases on non-disclosure although not private actions.
" 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965). There the court found that to the requirement that "the
individual plaintiff must have acted upon the fact misrepresented, is added the parallel requirement
that a reasonable man would also have acted upon the fact misrepresented."
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remedy under lOb-5." On the other hand, as departure from common law
fraud, it would appear that scienter" and privity" are no longer necessary
elements of proof. Likewise, the requirement of causation has been rejected
by some courts." Although the courts are not completely in harmony as
to what are the elements of a 1ob-5 cause of action, it is still evident that
the procedural and evidentiary advantages of such an action over a state
action make 10b-5 the best avenue for the defrauded investor to follow."
Rule lob-5 has been readily recognized in many types of fraudulent
situations-for example, nondisclosure,"' misrepresentation," and broker-
dealer fraud."' Outside these types of 10b-5 actions, the courts have hesi-
tated to tread. Particularly, the judicial recognition of the rule as a weapon
against the corporate insider who has perpetrated a fraud on the corpora-
tion by use of his managerial position has been cautious. Although it is
hornbook law that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
or to the corporation,"0 courts have been troubled in applying 1ob-5 where
there has been a breach of this duty. First, lob-5 specifically deals only
with the purchase or sale of securities."1 This is a limiting factor since there
is not always a purchase or sale of securities coinciding with a breach of
fiduciary duty. Secondly, there is the simple question of whether lob-5
should apply to what has always been a state cause of action." The prime
difficulty in applying lob-5 to breach of fiduciary duty is that a fraud is
not always involved. However, a violation of lob-5, albeit styled fraud,
22 Materiality encompasses those facts "which in reasonable and objective contemplation might
affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities and which the insider should reasonably
believe are unknown to the outsider." Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
2 Loss at 1440 states: "Scienter may be inferred where the lack of knowledge consists of ig-
norance of facts which any ordinary person under similar circumstances should have known."
Loss comes to the conclusion that scienter is not essential as an element of lob-i. But courts
previously held that intent is essential to a scheme to defraud, e.g., Rice v. U.S., 149 F.2d 601
(10th Cir. 1945). Other courts have inferred intent readily to escape the troublesome issue of
whether scienter was present, e.g., U.S. v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1960); Walters
v. U.S., 256 F.2d 840, 841 (9th Cir. 1958).
"The requirement of privity seems to have been done away with due to the broad notions
of lob-5. See, e.g., Fischmen v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (supports the
contention that privity of contract is not necessary to allow recovery); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (which held that if at the trial plaintiff could
prove the asserted allegations "the fact that there is no privity of contract does not amount to
a fatal defect of proof."); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (privity of
contract is at best only "evidentiary."); Texas Con. Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F.
Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ("The court
is of the opinion that [lack of privity] is not material under the statute."). Compare with, Joseph
v. Farnsworth Radio & Telev. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) where "a semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser of the
security in connection with which the improper act, practice or course of business was involved
seems to be requisite. ... ).
" Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, Darrer, Silver & Techmation Corp., 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) ("Plaintiff need not establish causation in a strictly mathematical sense.") Contra, Barnett
v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
2 Supra note 2.
" Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2 Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Matheson v. Armbrust,
284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960).
29BPOMBERG, ch. 5: Direct-Personal Dealing (Broker-Dealers).
' 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 1167-74 (1965), Comment, Fiduciary Duty
of Directors d Officers of Private Corporations, 27 TENN. L. REV. 284 (1960).
a' Supra note 12; infra note 36.
" Breach of fiduciary duty is a state cause of action, see, e.g., Burnett v. Word, 412 S.W.2d
792 (Tex. 1967).
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is not necessarily common law fraud. Therefore, the acts of a defendant
and the overall transaction must be viewed in light of the purpose" of
10b-S. As will be seen, a breach of fiduciary duty is possibly a violation
of lob-5 notwithstanding the absence of fraud."
The first decision to consider these problems was Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp." There a group of stockholders sued derivatively alleging
specific acts of fraud and a breach of fiduciary duties caused by the direc-
tors' rejection of an offer of merger which would have considerably bene-
fited the stockholders. The court easily dispensed with the case by holding
the shareholders had no standing to sue because they were neither sellers
nor purchasers within the meaning of ob-s. The exact meaning of "in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities" in 10b-s is not clear. It
is well established now that if the corporation was a purchaser or seller,
the individual plaintiff who sues derivatively need not also satisfy the
purchaser or seller requirement. For example, if the corporation has made
an issuance of stock in consideration of property received"0 or has ex-
changed stock for stock,"7 a coinciding purchase or sale of stock by the
individual is not prerequisite to a derivative suit. Conversely, if the indi-
vidual was a purchaser or seller, the corporation need not have this status
also.' However, the one who alleges the cause of action must have been
the one who sold or purchased his shares or stand in the shoes of the one
who did, i.e., sue derivatively. The problems concerning the meaning of
purchase or sale under 10b-5 arise when the fraudulent transaction in-
volves something other than a common law sale. For instance, a corporate
charter has been held to be a contract to sell if a shareholder is forced to
accept cash or securities pursuant to a merger."
Recently, the Second Circuit has placed serious doubt on the purchaser-
or-seller requirement by the decision of Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co."0 In
Vine, the defendant-directors of the subsidiary corporation acted in con-
cert with the directors of the parent corporation to effectuate a short-
form merger of the two corporations. The plaintiff, a shareholder in the
subsidiary, was forced to exchange his shares pursuant to the terms of
a Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
a Categorical cliches such as "this is a breach of fiduciary duty and not lob-$ fraud" or "this
is a state cause of action and not a lob-5 action" or "mismanagement versus lob-$ fraud" cannot
be avoided but must be carefully used. Otherwise, the trap of pigeonholing will blind the reader
to the overlap which does exist in all areas of lob-5, viz.,most state causes of action involving
fraud in connection with a security transaction can be brought under lob-5; but not all, in fact
only a few, lob-S actions can be brought on the state level.
s 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1951).
" Hooper v. Mountain States Security Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961) held that "[lit is not essential . . . that for an issuing corporation to come
under S 10(b) and X-10b-$ it have the status of an 'investor'." Rather, the corporation is that
type "person" encompassed in lob-5 and if the original issuance of stock in consideration of prop-
erty received was not a sale, "it certainly amounted to an arrangement in which [the corporation]
'otherwise dispose[d] of' its stock." (citing S 3(a) (14), 15 U.S.C.A. 5 78c(a) (14) (1964).
"
7O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
"' Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).39 Voege v. American Sumatia Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 196S) where the
court held the plaintiff was a seller since the charter is a contract to sell in that it required the
shareholder to accept the terms of any merger.
40 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the merger or pursue his appraisal rights in accordance with statutory
procedure. Plaintiff refused to exercise either course but instead sought to
have the merger set aside on the ground that it was carried out by
fraudulent means. The defendants argued that plaintiff had no standing
to sue because he was neither a seller nor purchaser as contemplated by
lob-S. The court answered this argument by holding that the plaintiff
had constructively sold his shares. The rationale was that the plaintiff
would eventually have to transfer his shares pursuant to the terms of the
merger or via appraisal rights, i.e., sell his shares." The court concluded
by acknowledging but not completely adopting the SEC's argument that
"prior decisions in this circuit [citing Birnbaum and O'Neill (discussed
infra) ], often cited for the rule that only a seller or purchaser may bring
a Rule lob-5 action, have been too broadly read and can be disting-
uished ...... Thus one can glean from the recent decisions that in the
absence of a clear corporate or individual sale or purchase the courts may
still imply such by construing the circumstances "not technically and re-
strictively, but flexibly to effectuate" the remedial purposes of the securi-
ties laws."
Turning to the issue of breach of fiduciary duty, the court in Birnbaum
held the plaintiffs had no federal cause of action because lob-5 was not
designed for the "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs" but
rather for "that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities. . . ."" While purporting
the follow Birnbaum's distinction between lob-5 fraud and "fraudulent
mismanagement," the district courts in the Second Circuit nevertheless
broadened the actions against insiders to managerial schemes containing
the "elements" of a lob-5 claim.' Hesitantly, the Second Circuit, when
subsequently with a question of fraudulent mismanagement, seemed to
fall in step with the broadening of lob-5 actions. In Ruckle v. Roto Am.
Corp.," the plaintiff, having accumulated enough voting power to take
the control of the board of directors from the defendants, sought injunc-
tive relief under lob-5 to restrain defendants from issuing a large block
of treasury stock to themselves thus perpetuating their control. Defendants
"' Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967) which cites Leech, Transac-
tions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 832-35 (1965).
42 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d Cir. 1967).
'aSEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
"Id. at 464. See Loss at 1469 where it is stated "by the same token, the Birnbaum case could
be readily distinguished on its facts if a future plaintiff . . . should allege (1) a conspiracy
between the seller and buyer to loot the corporation, or (2) a transfer of control under cir-
cumstances that should awaken the former insider's suspicion that the buyer would loot or mis-
manage the corporation." Loss implies that there is no guarantee that suit will lie under lob-5
but no precedent to date will show they would not come under lob-S.
' New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) held "[l]t is
immaterial whether the purchase or sale was part of a larger scheme of corporate mismanagement
if the elements of a claim under . . . rule Job-S are otherwise present." Ironically, the court
failed to enumerate the "elements" of a lob-5 claim while holding out the solution to all other
courts. New Park Mining was an extension of the same court's decision of Pettit v. American
Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) which held that lob-5 could not be used as a tool
for federal inquiry into mismanagement by insiders where the purchase or sale was only "inci-
dental to a major mismanagement issue."
40 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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relied on Birn/baum alleging that plaintiff had not stated "that type of
misreprcsentation of fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities" and further that the corporation could not
possibly be defrauded by the controlling majority of its board of directors.
The court of appeals rejected both defenses and held a valid claim under
lob-5 had been stated." The Second Circuit placed great weight on the
fact that to deny relief for such a "glaringly apparent" scheme would
leave the minority shareholder without a remedy under securities law.'
However, the possible far-reaching impact of Ruckle was diminished
somewhat by the later decision of the Second Circuit in O'Neill v. May-
tag,' also involving a control maneuver scheme. There again, as in Birn-
baum, the Second Circuit refused to extend Rule lob-5 to actions arising
from a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors. There was no mis-
representation, half-truth or nondisclosure familiar to the common lob-5
action. Instead, the directors, looking to their own interest first, attempted
to perpetuate their control which caused the corporation to suffer an un-
fair and inequitable business transaction."' The court said:
The question posed by this case is whether it is sufficient for an action
under Rule lob-5 to allege a breach of one of these general fiduciary duties
when the breach does not involve deception. We think it is not: At least where
the duty allegedly breached is only the general duty existing among corporate
officers, directors and shareholders, no cause of action is stated under Rule
lob-S unless there is an allegation of facts amounting to deception.".
In dismissing the complaint, the court attempted to distinguish Ruckle
on the basis that the facts involved "a clear allegation of deception," '
while the facts of O'Neill did not. Finally, the court summed up its posi-
tion by saying lob-5 was not intended as "a mandate to inquire into
every allegation of breach of fiduciary duty ... ""
As can be seen, reconciliation of O'Neill and Ruckle is a difficult, if not
impossible, task. One distinction rests on the presence of a defrauded
minority of directors in Ruckle whereas in O'Neill the board of directors
47 U. at 29. The court distinguished Birnbann, as applicable only when the allegedly defrauded
corporation was not a buyer or seller of securities. Also, the court held that "a majority or even
the entire board of directors may be held to have defrauded their corporation, when it is practical
as well as just to do so, courts have experienced no difficulty in rejecting such cliches as the
directors constitute the corporation and a corporation, like any other person, cannot defraud
itself."
43 Id. at 28, where it is stated, "Barring suit by a corporation defrauded under those circum-
stances would, as a legal and practical matter, destroy any remedy against the perpetrator of the
fraud."
49339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
sIn 1958, National and Pan American World Airways had each issued shares of its own stock
to a trustee for the benefit of the other. The CAB found this transaction detrimental to the
public interest and ordered an re-exchange of the stock. Two of the directors, while in complete
conttrol of the -board, found the National block of shares held by the trustee to be a threat to
their control of the board. National's board approved an exchange of their stock held by Pan
American for Pan American shares held by National. This exchange was extremely unfavorable to
the shareholders of National due to the market value of the Pan American stock.




a 11 . at 768.
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acted as a unit." Thus it would seem that if a corporation's minority seg-
ment alleges "deception" in violation of a fiduciary duty, a 10b-5 cause
of action is available; but, if there is a breach of fiduciary duty which
involves no deception, the claimant must seek the traditional redress under
state law for "fraudulent mismanagement." A more meaningful distinc-
tion is the "direct benefit of the cheap stock to the insider who got it,
not only in dollar terms but in terms of the control fight then in prog-
ress."' In Ruckle, the fraudulent transaction resulted in a direct benefit
to the majority directors, whereas in O'Neill, the directors benefited only
indirectly by eliminating the block of shares held by Pan American which
posed a threat to their control."" Whether this distinction of direct versus
indirect benefit to the directors will stand is yet to be seen."7 These
ostensible reconciliations are of little value when viewed with the "pur-
pose" of lob-5 as the criterion."8 In both cases there was an absence of
good faith, the transaction was not negotiated at arms-length, and a
detriment was suffered "in connection with a purchase or sale of securi-
ties." Yet, only one court found an "overreaching" within the meaning
of lob-s. Subsequently, decisions such as A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow9
seriously challenged the decision of O'Neill. In Brod, not only were the
narrow interpretations of Rule 10b-5 denounced, but also the court ex-
pressly broadened lob-5 so far as to include "all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique
form of deception.""' Thus, it would appear that the Birnbaum-O'Neill
distinction between "10b-5 fraud" and "fraudulent mismanagement" has
been discarded for the more equitable test: is this transaction one of
those "schemes" or "devices" which 10b-5 declares unlawful?"1
The court in the instant case of Entel v. Allen was confronted with
both problems of applying lob-5 to "fraudulent managerial schemes,"
viz., (1) whether the purchaser-or-seller requirement was essential, and
if so, whether it was satisfied and (2) whether a federal jurisdiction should
extend to actions based on breach of corporate fiduciary duty. Finding
itself "bound to follow the decisions of [the Second] Circuit," ' the court
dispensed with the first issue by interpreting Vine as possibly doing away
with the "purchaser-or-seller requirement."' Although this idea has been
"BROMBERG at 84 which states that the "availability of 10b-5 [in Ruckle] turned on the
fortuity of having minority directors." This same distinction is drawn in 1966 DUKE L.J. 167,
182-83.
I5 See BROMBERG at 84.
5 See BROMBERG at 4.7(1) n.67.
57 See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehana Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967) where "direct benefit"
in the form of cash was acquired by indirection in violation of a corporate fiduciary duty.
" Supra note 3.
5 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 397.
6' Cases such as A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Ruckle v. Roto
American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp.
261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pettit v. American Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). illustrate
the courts application of 10b-5 in line with its "purpose" rather than emphasizing the "fraud"
nature of lob-5 as in Birnbaum.
" Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Id. at 70.
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followed," most courts have refused to apply lob-5 in the absence of a
purchaser or a seller.' Indeed, another court expressly stated that the
Birnbaum-O'Neill requirement of purchaser-or-seller has not been over-
ruled by Vine or Brod but rather "the question was expressly left open.""
As has been stated, it is now well established that the corporation and in-
dividual need not be sellers or purchasers simultaneously; but, the one
who alleges the cause of action must have been a purchaser-or-seller or
stand in the shoes of the one who was." At this point, the court in Entel
went astray when presented with one party who had the cause of action
(the individual for breach of fiduciary duty) and another party who
had the standing to sue (Atlas Corporation was a seller). Rather than
viewing the shareholder in Vine as having met the purchaser-or-seller re-
quirement by having "constructively" sold his shares, the Entel court
allowed plaintiff standing to sue by interpreting Vine as possibly doing
away with the purchaser-or-seller requirement. Why did plaintiff in Entel
not allege breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation as well as to the
shareholder? Admittedly the court found no "deception practiced on
Atlas" which would preclude recovery under O'Neill. But even though
there was no deception at the corporate level, the transaction was inequit-
able and a direct benefit accrued to director Hughes. Put in this light,
the circumstances of Entel more closely resemble Ruckle than O'Neill.
Thus, a derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion would give a cause of action to the one who had standing to sue,
making it unnecessary to rely on Vine. Although it has been submitted
that Judge Bonsal's construction of Vine is "unwarranted" and that such
case should be limited to its facts,"9 his interpretation is correct to the
extent that it recognizes the purchaser-or-seller requirement has been
softened. For example, the Supreme Court and Congress "never intended
to give to the word 'sale' the limited common-law meaning"" but rather
includes short-form mergers,' actions for injunctions which do not re-
" See, e.g., Weitzen & Epstein v. Kearns, 271 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) where Judge
Bonsai stated "[T]he purchaser-or-seller and the securities-fraud limitations placed on the ap-
plication of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by the court in O'Neill and Birnbaum have been
seriously challenged, if not overruled."
"See, e.g., Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Federal Securities Law Reporter
91,978 at 96,325 (1966-67 Trans. Binder) (2d Cir. 1967) where it was stated that "[t]his court
has expressly left undecided the question whether one who is neither a purchaser nor a seller can
attack a transaction under Rule lob-S .. " In United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of America,
Federal Securities Law Reporter 5 91,975 at 96,315 (1966-67 Trans. Binder) (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
Judge Palmieri recognized the danger of granting a summary judgment due to "expanded applica-
tion of federal jurisdiction to cases of this nature by the Second Circuit...." (citing Vine, Brod
and Entel.).
"Greenstein v. Paul, Federal Securities Law Reporter 5 92,011 at 96,435 (1966-67 Trans.
Binder) (S.D.N.Y. 1967) the court said Vine "did not hold that plaintiff need not be a seller.
Rather, the court held that on the facts of that case plaintiff was to be considered a seller with-
in the meaning of Section 10(b)."
67 See notes 36-38, supra.
68270 F. Supp. 60, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"'Lockwood, Corporate Acquisitions and Actions Under Secs. 10(b) and 14, 23 THE BUSINESS
LAWYER (1968).
70 Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
71 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
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quire a "sale" as a prerequisite," and original issuance of stock."'
Thus, while Judge Bonsal's observations on Vine may be correct, his
allowance of standing to sue for breach of state fiduciary duty based on
Brod is questionable. The court interpreted Brod's statement of lob-5 pro-
hibiting "all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities" as necessarily including "undisclosed scheme (s) to breach State
corporate fiduciary law. . . ''" At first glance, one might conclude that
"all fraudulent schemes" means any fraud which has the fortuity of in-
volving securities. But a careful reading of Brod shows that the court
expressly recognized the distinction in actions based on lob-5 fraud and
fraud brought on the state level by stating: "whether there is actionable
fraud [under lob-5] or a mere breach of contract depends on the facts
and circumstances developed at the trial . . . [Emphasis added.]." 5 It
cannot be questioned that "mere breach of contract" is a state cause of
action. Indeed, Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco8 held that lob-5 does not
extend to undisclosed schemes in violation of state corporate fiduciary
law, 7 at least when the scheme is perpetrated by an outsider.
Should a lob-5 cause of action be available against the director who
has breached his fiduciary duty? Remembering that lob-S was intended
as an equitable and prophylactic relief7 " which is not limited by common
law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty does come within the purview of
lob-5 due to its unfair and inequitable nature. While Judge Bonsal's ex-
tension of 10b-5 to breach of fiduciary duty may prove in the future to
have been foresighted, no case has gone so far to date." Instead of trying
to find precedent for the extension of lob-5 to breach of fiduciary duty,"
a flat, unprecedented statement that lob-5 was not only intended to
remedy such breaches but also that a natural and logical inference drawn
from Ruckle leads to this conclusion would have been met with great
support. ' The shareholder who has been defrauded but who is lacking
the good fortune of having sold or purchased securities as an incident of
the fraud might view the Entel decision as the needed precedent to seek
his remedy due to that court's construction of Vine. In the same vein, the
shareholder who has a cause of action based on breach of corporate fiduciary
72 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Federal Securities Law Reporter 5 91,983 at 96,345 (1966-
67 Trans. Binder) (2d Cir. 1967) held the purchaser-or-seller requirement was not controlling in
an injunctive suit even though "some doubt has been cast on this principle (citing Entel), the
Court of Appeals has never overruled it. In recent decisions the question was expressly left open."
7Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961).
" Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), held that Brod involved an action for
breach of contract and further held that "if an undisclosed scheme to breach state contract law is
encompassed by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-s, then an undisclosed scheme to breach State cor-
port fiduciary law must also be covered."
75 A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
" Federal Securities Law Reporter 01 91,983 (1966-67 Trans. Binder) (2d Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 96,344.
" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
"'Not even an extension of Brod would give rise to such a conclusion.
80 Judge Bonsai tried to find the Brod's language as giving a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty.
"i The SEC surely would approve an extension of their authority as would the lower courts of
the Second Circuit would approve the extension of Rucklr.
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duty will seek redress in the federal system using Entel's interpretation of
Brod as precedent. However, shareholder rejoicing should possibly await
the rendering of a higher court's decision as to whether the purchaser-or-
seller requirement has been abolished and whether there is a distinction
between state actions for breach of fiduciary duty and federal actions
based on Rule lob-5.
Indeed, if this distinction between state actions and federal actions is
not drawn soon, the potency of the federal cause of action under 10b-5
may cause a snowball effect preempting all state fraud actions in the
securities field. While it cannot be doubted that lob-5 has had a forceful
and dynamic impact, it must have some boundaries. Judge Bonsal's con-
clusion that further judicial extension of 10b-5 should await congressional
action is an understatement. The shareholder who is elated with the de-
cision of Entel should be warned that, at the present time, this decision
is on the outer edge of the boundary of lOb-5. However, if the decision
of Entel is upheld, the next shareholder who is uncertain as to the remedies




Conflict of Laws - Wrongful Death - Significant
Contacts vs. Lex Loci
Suit was brought in Texas for the wrongful death of the passengers of a
chartered aircraft that crashed in Colorado on 3 November 1964. With
the exception of one passenger who was an Illinois resident, all aboard the
,plane were residents of Texas. Three of the four passengers were executives
of a Texas-based corporation that had contracted the trip with Mustang
Aviation, Inc. whose principal place of business was Texas. The aircraft was
garaged, maintained, licensed, and contracted for in Texas and the con-
nection between any of the "principals and Colorado was limited to the
crash itself. Appellants contended that since the most significant total re-
lationship with the flight was had by Texas, the arbitrary limitation on
damages recoverable under the Colorado wrongful death statute should not
be applied by the Texas court to limit appellant's recovery. Held, af-
firmed: Irrespective of Texas' sole significant interest in the measure of re-
covery for the wrongful death of Texas residents, the conflicts rule of lex
loci delicti determines all substantive matters including the measure of
damages. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967), error granted.
Three months prior to this decision, in a factually similar New York
crash case, the Second Circuit held that the law to be applied is the law of
the place having the most significant relationship with, and the greatest
interest in, the issues presented. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F
2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
Lex loci delicti is the traditional rule that the law of the place where a
tort is committed governs the existence and extent of any liability there-
for.' The rule historically has been applied by the courts in tort cases to de-
cide which state's substantive law shall be controlling in such issues as
whether an act is the legal cause of another's injury" and the measure of
damages for a tort.' The rule evolved from those cases in which the forum
state's only interest was in providing a neutral forum because the per-
tinent facts had occurred in another state. In 1904 the application of lex
IH. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 165 (4th ed. 1964).
'RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 383 (1934): Whether an act is the legal cause of
another's injury is determined by the law of the place of the wrong. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.,
194 U.S. 120 (1903); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Barney, 262 Ky. 228, 90 S.W.2d 14 (1936); Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Pendar v. H. & B. American Machine
Co., 35 R. I. 321, 87 A. 1 (1913).
'RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at § 412: The measure of damages for a tort is
determined by the law of the place of the wrong. Black Diamond v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336
U.S. 386 (1948); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903), aff'd in Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1913).
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loci delicti was approved by a United States Supreme Court case,' in which
suit was brought in Texas for a wrongful death occurring in Mexico. The
Court announced the rule that "as the only source of this obligation is the
law of the place of the act, it follows that the law determines not merely
the existence of the obligation . . . but equally its extent." Under the
theory of lex loci delicti, a tort is considered to "vest" its victim with a
locally created cause of action (including extent of recovery) which fol-
lows him and is enforceable in any jurisdiction where suit is brought The
advantages of the rule are by-products of its arbitrariness: results are con-
sistent, and absolute predictability strongly discourages forum shopping.
In early cases, lex loci delicti was enforced unless the entire basis of the
claim upon which the suit was brought was contrary to public policy6
or unless the limitation of recoverable damages is contrary to the forum's
public policy." But even with these exceptions the rule led at times to ap-
parently unjust and unacceptable results, and some court began enforcing
a less rigid application of the rule. Various interpretations resulted: where
defamation occurred in several states, the law of the plaintiff's domicile was
held to govern;8 survival of causes of action should be governed by the
law of the forum because it is a procedural question;9 the question of in-
terspousal immunity was held to be governed by the law of the domicile
of the parties;"0 damage limitation was contrary to public policy;1 the law
of the forum was held applicable when the foreign law had not been
proved and the presumption was that the foreign law is the same as that
of the forum. ' The rule of lex loci delicti is, however, still followed in a
majority of the decisions in this country. 3
The advent of increased popularity of the airplane and resulting crashes
has greatly emphasized the shortcomings of lex loci. With the speed and
range of air travel, the locus of the negligence and the locus of the resulting
injury, if determinable at all, may be in different states and are likely to
be fortuitous. ' The mechanical application of the rule of lex loci delicti
'Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903). Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was not subject
to law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligatio, which, like other obliga-
tions, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., supra at 126-27.
'Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1903).
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, Supra note 2, at S 612: No action can be maintained upon a
cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public
policy of the forum.
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Poling v. Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E.
604 (1935).
'Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953).
'Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
1" Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), noted in 73 HARV.
L. REV. 785 (1960).
" Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961),
noted in 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1497 (1961), 46 CORNELL L.Q. 637 (1961), 49 GEO. L.J. 768
(1961); 74 HARV. L. REV. 1652 (1961); U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1961); 47 VA. L. REV. 692
(1961).
'"Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
' For recent compilation of the jurisdictions that apply the lex loci rule, Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d
12 (1964).
"4See facts developed in Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 386,
260 N.Y.S.2d 750, rev'd, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 226 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965), where air-
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has resulted in a disregard of the locus of the negligence unless that ele-
ment arose in the state in which the crash occurred. The result has been
that the place of the injury has been of controlling importance.
Dissatisfaction with the rule became increasingly apparent in the early
sixties with the New York Court of Appeals decision of Kilberg I. North-
east Airlines, Inc.,'5 which arose out of the same crash as did Gore. Al-
though applying the rule of lex loci delicti to the extent of recognizing the
Massachusetts wrongful death statute as the creator of the cause of action,
the court classified the damage limitation as procedural; and in the dictum
stated that strong New York public policy required recoverable damage
limitations, thus the law of the forum regarding damages would govern.
Two years later the same court decided the landmark case of Babcock v.
Jackson,"' in which plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while a
guest in defendant's car on a weekend trip to Canada. After finding that
all the significant contacts, with the exception of the place of injury, were
in New York, the court rejected the rule of lex loci because it failed to
recognize other jurisdictions' interests in the tort. The court adopted a
flexible principle of applying the law of the state with the greatest interest
in the issues to be resolved. In 1964 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over-
ruled 8 the doctrine of lex loci delicti in favor of a more flexible rule, simi-
lar to that announced in Babcock, which would permit "the interplay
and clash of conflicting policy factors." In 1965 a unanimous New York
Court of Civil Appeals in Long v,. Pan American World Airways"l ex-
tended the Babcock principle to wrongful death cases and the constitution-
ality of such abandonment was approved by Richards v. United States
in 1962." The Court had before it the question of which conflicting
statutory damage limitation was applicable in a multi-state tort claim for
wrongful death. It held that the forum state, after analysis of the com-
peting interests, could constitutionally apply the law of any state which
had significant contact with the multi-state tort involved.
Although the court in Marmon recognized that it would be on safe con-
stitutional grounds to follow Richards, it concluded that the Courts of
Civil Appeals of Texas were bound by stare decisis. The court found merit
in the doctrine of most significant contacts but decided that it was bound
by the construction which the Texas Supreme Court and other Texas
liner disintegrated over the Delaware-Maryland border.
" Supra note 7.
"Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); but see, Kell v. Henderson,
263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aft'd, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966) where court held that defendants
could not move for leave to amend their answer to plead the Ontario guest statute as an affirmative
defense in a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident which occurred in New
York involving residents and domiciliaries of Ontario, Canada. Babcock held inapplicable because
it was not intended to and did not change the established law of New York that a guest has :
cause of action for personal injuries against a host in an accident occurring within New York
whether those involved are residents or domiciliaries of New York or not.
17191 N E.2d at 284.
as Grilrith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
"'Long v, Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1965).
"'Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). The Supreme Court recognized the inade-
quacies of Slater.
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courts have placed upon the relevant Texas conflicts statute.' The court
rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the limitation on damages be con-
sidered a procedural matter, rather than a matter of the right of recovery,
2
and that the Colorado statute with its limitation on damages is contrary to
the public policy of Texas.2 ' The latter conclusion was based on a Texas
Supreme Court case holding that Texas courts may not refuse to recognize
and enforce a foreign right of action merely because Texas law, as applied
to the same facts, would afford no relief.
An opposite holding was reached in the instant case of Gore in which
the Second Circuit found that since it had jurisdiction by virtue of diver-
sity of citizenship, it must apply New York law in determining whether
the $15,000 limitation on plaintiff's recoverable damages for wrongful
death should apply. The Gore court recognized the Kilberg dictum that al-
though the right to sue for damages was based upon a Massachusetts statute
under the rule of lex loci delictus, the limitation upon the recovery could
not be applied because it contravened a strong New York public policy.
The court noted that the Kilberg view, the law of the place of the injury
applies as the creator of the cause of action, was supplanted by the reason-
ing in Babcock that the law to be applied to the entire cause of action is
the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship with,
and the greatest interest in, the issue presented. The finding in Gore is
based upon the Babcock-Long criteria of significant contacts with the re-
sult that New York law is the most logical to be applied by virtue of the
most significant contacts which the court enumerates and analyzes." These
significant contacts and not the weight of the strong New York public pol-
icy against recovery limitations determined which state's law was to be
applied in Gore.
Two conflicts theories are set forth in the instant cases. Vis d vis the
strict rule of lex loci delicti upon which the holding in Marmon is based,
the decision in Gore allows a more flexible rule permitting rather than pre-
cluding analysis of underlyinz issues. The Marnion court construed the
21T:x. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.. art. 4678 (1952) provides:
Whenever the death or personal injury of a citizen of this State or of the United
States, or of any foreign country having equal treaty rights with the United States
on behalf of its citizens, has been or may be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another in any foreign State or country for which a right to maintain
an action and recover damages thereof is given by the statute or law of such foreign
State or country, such right of action may be enforced in the courts of this State
within the time prescribed for the commencement of such actions by the statutes
of this State. The law of the forum shall control in the prosecution and maintenance
of such action in the courts of this State in all matters pertaining to the procedure
[Emphasis added.].
22 The court regarded this approach as unsound and contrary to the holdings in: Davis v. Gant,
247 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref.; Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Miller, 128 S.W. 1165
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error ref.; Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Gross, 128 S.W. 1173 (Tex. Civ. App.
1910) error ref.
aa Flaiz v Moore, 3S9 S.W.2d 872, 876 (Tex. 1962).
24Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.. 373 F.2d 717, 724, 725 (2d Cir. 1967); see also, RESTATE-
MrNT (SEcoND) CON1FLICT OF LAWS § 379, ch. 9 at (2) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) provides that:
Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most
significant relationhip include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the
place where the conduct occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship,
if any, bctween the parties is centered.
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Texas conflicts statute such that the forum state must look to the state
where the injury occurred for a right of action; not only was this state's
law the creator of the cause of action, but it also determined the extent of
the recoverable damages. Gore, on the other hand, held that the state which
has the most significant contact with the controversy is the source not only
of the extent of recoverable damages, but also of the right of action.
The Texas conflicts statute is susceptible of a construction which would
allow the Supreme Court of Texas to adopt the significant contacts theory
without having to seek reform in the legislature. The statute provides that
where an action for damages arises under foreign law, "such right of ac-
tion may be enforced in the courts of this State ...... Since the wording
of the statute does not make enforcement of the foreign right of action
mandatory, the court is free to allow plaintiff to enforce that right of
action given in the statutes of the state whose law is applicable by virtue
of that state having the most significant contacts with the controversy.
This interpretation would not lead to constitutional difficulties because the
holding in Richards allows the forum state to apply the law of any state
which had significant contact with the multi-state tort.
It is conceivable in an airplane crash case that an application of the sig-
nificant contacts theory would result in a limitation on damages which
would not have been present under an application of lex loci delicti. Had
the crash in Marmon occurred in Texas and the significant contacts been
found in Colorado, and the theory of significant contacts been applicable,
the court would have been constrained to apply the law of Colorado and
the plaintiff's recoverable damages would have been limited. This would
not, however, be inequitable, for it would be the result of the consideration
and analysis of all the significant competing interests and not merely those
of the state in which the crash occurred.
William 0. Wuester III
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Eminent Domain - Inverse Condemnation - Taking
or Damaging
In 19 5 0 the Mississippi Legislature enacted an Airport Zoning Act, which
authorized the creation of local airport zoning boards; these boards were
to administer zoning regulations for airport hazard areas. The Act in-
cluded provisions for the acquisition of air rights, avigation easements,
and other necessary land interests.' In compliance with the provisions of
this act the Joint Airport Zoning Board for Hinds and Rankin counties,
Mississippi, enacted a zoning ordinance establishing certain graduated
height restrictions for the area immediately surrounding the Jackson
Municipal Airport. These restrictions placed eighty acres of appellee's land
within an Instrument Approach Zone and a Transition 'Surface Zone,'
thereby limiting the height of any structure or trees on this land to fifty
feet. Subsequently, the appellee allowed fifteen trees on his land to grow
into the restricted airspace. The trees, which had no appreciable economic
value, ranged from one to thirteen feet above the restrictive fifty foot
ceiling. The Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and the City of Jack-
son sought a preliminary injunction to require the appellee to "top" or
remove the specified fifteen trees, but the Hinds County Chancery Court
sustained the landowner's general demurer to the complaint. Held, affirmed:
The Mississippi Supreme Court found the zoning order "so interfered with
and restricted the use and enjoyment of the defendant-appellee's private
property as to constitute a taking or damaging thereof for public use
without compensation being first made."' Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v.
Evans, 191 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1966).
Property rights in airspace are divided into two categories: public, the
United States claims ownership of all airspace above the land and territories
within its federal jurisdiction," and private, "the landowner owns at least
as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in con-
nection with the land."'
Prior to United States v. Causby,6 the landmark case which established
the latter principle, landowners' remedies for damages from aircraft and
airports lay mainly in the tort actions of trespass and nuisance, which
proved inadequate for several reasons. First, the modern statutes that
modified the common law concept of sovereign immunity often limited
government liability in tort actions to cases involving negligence.! Second,
I Airport Zoning Act § 7544-13, 6 Miss. ConE ANN. § 7544-13 (1956).
These terms are used as defined in the zoning ordinance passed by the Joint Zoning Board.
'The basis of the decision was article 3, section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1508, 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).328 U.S. 256 (1946).
'This is the provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 101, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2680(a) (1958); see also Tucker Act, 63 Stat. 62, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1958).
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trespass, which was designed to protect the exclusive possession of land,8
required a direct invasion of the airspace for compensation.' Consequently,
injury from noise and other incidences of aircraft not flying directly over
one's property went uncompensated."' For such damage, private nuisance
was the appropriate remedy, but there had to be an unreasonable inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of property before damages would be
granted." Third, nuisance had its limitations. In applying this remedy,
the courts' attempts to balance the interest of freedom of transit and
public need against the concept of free and unrestricted use and enjoyment
of the land have usually put the injured party at a disadvantage for two
reasons. (1) When the landowner sought an injunction against the noise,
he often confronted the doctrine of "legalized nuisance" which established
the rule that nuisance claims arising from a legally authorized public
facility would be denied.'2 (2) Another obstacle he confronted was Sec-
tion 60.17 of the Civil Air Regulations,'" which includes the airspace
necessary for takeoffs and landings as part of the defined minimum safe
altitudes and encompasses it within navigable airspace." As the public has
the right of transit in all navigable airspace,'" any interference arising
from takeoffs and landings must amount to a constitutional "taking" in
order for the plaintiff to recover.
Under the constitutional concepts of "taking" or "damaging" of pri-
vate property, landowners have been much more successful in recovering
for their losses than under trespass and nuisance. The Fifth Amendment,
the basis of the doctrine of "taking," prohibits the acquisition of property
for public use without due compensation. It has been interpreted to place
such a limitation on "all the sovereign powers of government which may
be used to interfere with the quiet enjoyment of private property . . .
[Emphasis added.]."'" As "any limitation on the free use and enjoyment
of property constitutes a taking of property within the meanifig of the
'F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS S 33 (1933).
9RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 159 (1965) provides:
2. Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but
only if,
a. it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and
b. it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his land.
"Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962); see also Tondel, Noise Litigation at
Public Airports, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 387 (1966).
" F. HARPER, LAw OF TORTS 5 181 (1933). These cases fall into the category of private
nuisance. See, e.g., Corbett v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 166 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1964). Prosser states
that any substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land is a private
nuisance; W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 611 (3rd ed. 1964).
"2 Richards v. Washington Term. Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
"
3 Civil Air Regulations S 60.17, 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1956).
" This interpretation of Sec. 60.17 is developed in Civil Air Regulations, pt. 60, Interp. No. 1,
19 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603 (1954). This argument is fully developed in Harvey, Landowner's Rights
in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. RLv. 1313 (198).
"s Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 104, 72 Stat. 104, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
16 See, e.g., Harvey, Landowner's Right; in the Air Age: I"be Airport Dilrna, 56 MicI,. L.
REV. 1313 (1958). This argument is reinforced by the redefinition of navigable airspace in the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to include airspace necessary for take-offs and landings. Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 § 101, 72 Stat. 737, as amen/ed, 75 Stat. 467, 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. § 1301
(1964).
i"2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN S 6.1 (3rd ed. J. Sackman 1963).
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constitutional provision,"'" it is not necessary to divest the owner of his
title to or interest in the property. However, the taking must "substan-
tially oust the owner from the possession of the land or deprive him of
all beneficial use thereof . . . for merely damaging property does not
necessarily constitute a taking [Emphasis added.]."'" It must be noted
that, while "taking" applies to the federal government, and to some state
governments, the doctrine of "damaging" applies to those states which
have amended the eminent domain provisions of their constitutions to
provide that property cannot be "taken or damaged." This distinction
between the federal doctrine of "taking" and the state doctrine of "dam-
aging" is significant, particularly in inverse condemnation cases.
In defining a "compensable damaging," most states have required some-
thing more than just an appreciable decline in the market value of land.
The Illinois rule is typical:
[C]ompensation is required not only when there is an injury that would
be actionable at common law, but also in all cases in which it appears that
there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private,
which the owner of a parcel of land enjoys in connection with his property
and which gives it an additional value, and that by reason of such disturbance
he has sustained a special damage with respect to his property in excess of
that sustained by the public generally [Emphasis added.]."
The application of these concepts varies with each case, but, as stated in
Jensen v. United States,2'
There is, unfortunately, no simple litmus test for discovering in all cases
when an avigation easement is first taken by overflights. Some annoyance
must be borne without compensation. The point when that stage is passed
depends on a particularized judgment evaluating such factors as the fre-
quency and level of the flights; the type of planes; the accompanying effects,
such as noise or falling objects; the uses of the property; the effect on values;
the reasonable reactions of humans below; and the impact upon animals and
vegetable life.22
In general, the application of the "taking" doctrine to cases involving
landowners' rights in adjacent and surrounding airspace has fallen into
two categories: those involving restrictions on the use of land adjacent
to airports, usually through the enforcement of zoning ordinances, and
those concerning airspace usurped by low and frequent flights. 3 The courts
have drawn parallels between the result of low flights over land and re-
stricted height zoning, and have held both to constitute a taking of an
avigation easement. Hence, the tests applied and the limitations imposed
upon the concept of constitutional taking by low-flying aircraft are
relevant in the present case of restrictive height zoning.
'
8 id. at S 6.1(1).
'
9 d. at 5 6.38.
2°Id. at 5 6.441(3).
" 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. CI. 1962).
22 305 F.2d at 447.
23These are the major categories, but others do exist. Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 135S (1961).
24 Note, 31 J. AIu' L. & COM. 366 (1965) developed this distinction; see, e.g., Harrell's Candy
Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 1II So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
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The only definite limit placed upon the concept of constitutional "tak-
ing" is that flights above the minimum safe altitudes prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Board are immune from liability.2 ' However, Causby
implies a second limitation. As the landowner is entitled to such airspace
as he needs for the use of his land, he will be compensated for takings
that interfere with this use.2" One definition of a "taking" of airspace
limits claims to those alleging interference with a "reasonable use,""
which limits the landowner's ownership:
to that part of the air as may be effectively possessed by the surface owner,
or as is necessary to the reasonable use of the surface of the land [Emphasis
added. ].
Another concept that limits the landowner's recovery was set out in
Causby: "not every violation of an owner's airspace constitutes a taking.
It is only when they (the overflights) are so low and so frequent as to be
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land that they constitute a taking."2 This concept of a "direct and im-
mediate interference" requires that both the character and the degree of
the invasion be something more than mere inconvenience or a decline
in the market value of the land. This limitation is frequently applied by
the courts."' A final limitation on the concept of constitutional "taking"
is the doctrine of "substantial interference." The Supreme Court of Ohio
has stated:
Under this broad construction (of a taking) there need not be a physical
taking of the property or even dispossession; any substantial interference
with the elemental rights growing out of the ownership of private property
is considered a taking [Emphasis added.]."
The court here stresses that there can be a non-physical appropriation of
" Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959). These altitudes are 500 feet
over noncongested areas and 1000 feet above congested areas. Civil Air Regulations § 60.17, 14
C.F.R. § 60.17 (1956) and 20 Fed. Reg. 6694 (1955).
2Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 799 (Ct. Cl. 1963), the court commented indirectly on
this point at 800:
But plaintiffs had no use for this air space, except as it contributed to their use and
enjoyment of the surface of the ground, and except as it insured against an impair-
ment of their use and enjoyment of the surface of the ground. As long as these
flights did not seriously interfere with the use and enjoyment of their properties, the
defendant did not impose a servitude upon them for which plaintiffs are entitled to
compensation.
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (Ct. Cl. 1963) at 757-58:
Title to air space unconnected with the use of land is inconceivable. Such a right has
never been asserted. It is a thing not known to the law.
The air, like the sea, is by its nature incapable of private ownership, except in so far
as one may actually use it . . . . We own so much of the space above the ground as
we can occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of our land. This
right is not fixed. It varies with our varying needs and is coextensive with them. The
owner of the land owns as much of the space above his land as he uses, but only so
long as he uses it.
The use which the property owner claims must be more than mere spiteful interference with the
airflights. United Airports Co. Ltd. v. Hinman, I Av. L. Rip. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
272 P. NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN S 5.781 (3rd ed. J. Sackman 1963). One case used a similar
term, "common and necessary use," to limit the appslicabihty of the use concept of Causby. Thorn-
burg v. Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
2" United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2State v. Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405 (1965).
'Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938).
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property, i.e., airplane noise, provided the interference complained of is
substantial.
Therefore, "reasonable use," "direct and immediate interference," and
"substantial interference" are terms that may be used to determine whether
there has been a "taking." The basis of all three terms is simply that not
every damage to property, nor every invasion of airspace above that prop-
erty is compensable. As there is no rigid definition of these terms, each
case inevitably turns on the question of the degree of the injury sustained."'
The philosophy of the courts becomes more evident when it is realized
that the language of the tests-reasonableness, direct and immediate inter-
ference, substantial interference-is drawn from the tort remedy of nuis-
ance," which, as Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc.3 indicates, is based on a balanc-
ing of opposing interests:
At the point where "reasonableness" enters the judicial process we take
leave of trespass and steer into the discretionary byways of nuisance. Each
case then must be decided on its own peculiar facts, balancing the interests
before the court [Emphasis added.].34
Noting that the two interests to be balanced in airport cases are those of
the landowners and those of the traveler, the court continued:
[r]easonableness is so inherent in the judicial balancing of interests in the
airport cases that most of the decisions . . . simply proceed to investigate
the facts and then grant or deny relief upon the basis of the reasonableness
of one interest yielding to another in a given case. . . .In following such a
balancing of interests as a means of reaching a decision, the courts employ
nuisance concepts with only a passing gesture in the direction of the laws of
trespass.-
In contrast to the flexible "reasonable" standard for determining a con-
stitutional "taking," the concept of "damaging" implies the rigidity of
an "absolute liability" approach. In 1870 Illinois amended the eminent
domain section of its constitution to include a "taking or damaging"
clause; twenty-four other states have followed the lead."' This departure
from the standards set by the Fifth Amendment was undertaken in an
obvious attempt to broaden the sphere of recovery for landowners by
avoiding the limitations of a "taking."3 However, the courts continued
to use the balance of interests approach to avoid the logical premise of the
"damage" concept, i.e., that any ascertainable decline in the market value
of property caused by the operation of a public facility (such as an air-
port) is a justiciable claim.3"
312 P. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at § 6.1 (1).
32 For a good example of the language of nuisance, see Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 I1.
App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48 (1954).
" Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960).
31355 P.2d at 232.
3s355 P.2d at 232.
382 P. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at § 6.1(3) n.28.
" Brown v. Seattle, 5 W. 35, 31 P. 313 (1892).
382 P. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at § 6.441(1). Also refer to Comment, Inv erse Condemnnatim,
in Washing/ou-Is the Lid off Pandora's Box?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920 (1964). For a specific Mis-
sissippi case see King v. Vicksburg Light Co., 88 Miss. 456, 42 So. 204 (1906).
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Recently though, a Washington case, Martin v. Port of Seattle, refused
to follow this trend; it revivified the original purpose of the "taking or
damaging" clause in the Washington constitution. In discounting the
importance of the distinction between "taking" and "damaging" the court
stated:
The specific purpose .. . [of the "damaging" clause] is to avoid the dis-
tinction attached to the word 'taking' appropriate to a bygone era. It is
unnecessary to become embroiled in the technical differences between a
taking and a damaging in order to accord the broader conceptual scope
intended by the additional language. 9
While endorsing the original intent which prompted the addition of the
"damaging" clause to that state's constitution, the Supreme Court of
Washington noted that the concept of "substantial" damage has no appli-
cation to modern constitutional concepts."°
It [the term "substantial" damage] connotes a balancing of the interests of
the public in general against those of the individual. Inherent is the idea
that the individual must bear a certain amount of inconvenience and loss of
peace and quiet as the cost of living in a modern, progressing society. In
eminent domain, and in inverse condemnation, such a balancing does not
have to be accomplished as a distinct process, simply because the individual
seeks no recovery for his individual suffering, damage, loss of quiet, or other
disturbance. These elements of damage are cognizable in a tort action, and
such a balancing would thus be necessary. But in inverse condemnation the
measure of recovery is injury to market value, and that alone.4'
It is submitted that the court's sole reliance on injury to market value
as the measure of recovery for inverse condemnation amounts to an
espousal of an absolute liability concept.
In the instant case, appellants claimed that there was no interference
with the reasonable and ordinary use of airspace above the land of the
appellees. They contended that "[i]t is difficult to see how wild, unin-
habited and unimproved land could have any reasonable and ordinary us-
able airspace above fifty feet from the ground."" Appellants asserted the
validity of the zoning ordinance and relied on Harrell's Candy Kitchen v.
Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority,3 in which the reasonableness of a re-
stricted height zoning ordinance was upheld as a valid exercise of police:
power. On the other hand, appellees maintained that the "use of airspace
above land, at least to the height reasonably required for normal growth
391 P.2d 540, 546 (Wash. 1964).
Apparently, it is contemplated that litigants will have one cause of action for permanent
damage to land, where it is known that the public use causing the injury will be a permanent
public improvement. See, e.g., Cheskov v. Seattle, 348 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1960) where the land-
owners were denied recovery by the statute of limitations, ,ince the incidental damage complained
of by the litigants could have been reasonably foreseen at the time the disturbances first began
occurring. Hence, in a suit under the "damage" theory, the landowner's petition must allege all
damage, past, present and future, which is reasonably foreseeable, or a later cause of action for
such damage may be barred by a statute of limitations.
4 391 P.2d at 546.
'Brief for Appellant at 14, Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126
(Miss. 1966).
' Brief for Appellant at 20, Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126
(Miss. 1966), citing Harrell's Candy Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., iii So. 2d 439
(Fla. 1959).
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of trees, is a constitutionally protected property right which cannot be
taken or damaged for public use without payment of just compensation.""
They conceded that the validity of the Airport Zoning Act and the Air-
port Zoning Order was not at issue, but they maintained that the occu-
pancy by the trees in question was a reasonable and ordinary use of the
airspace.
Conspicuously absent from the court's opinion is any mention of the
reasonableness of the use of the land, of substantial damage to the land,
or of the zoning ordinance as a direct and immediate interference with
the use and enjoyment of the land. A reasonable assumption is that the
court accepted the appellee's contention that the occupancy by the trees
was a reasonable use of the land. Also absent from the opinion was any
attempt to distinguish between a "taking" and a "damaging," the court
merely concluding that the phrase "taking or damaging" covered the fact
situation in the present case. It is unfortunate that the court did not
explain its reasoning in the present case. As it stands, the decision leaves
many important elements to inference. Seemingly, the present case is in
consonance with the opinion in Martin v. Port of Seattle, except that the
Martin opinion expressly disavows the importance of the distinction be-
tween "taking" and "damaging," whereas the present case ignores the
distinction. While Martin returns to the rigid "market-value" test of
liability for damage to property, it is uncertain to what extent the pres-
ent case follows suit. However, considering the facts of the instant case,
it is reasonable to assume that the court used the Martin test for liability
rather than the balancing of interests approach.
It is apparent, then, that there is a wide discrepancy between the results
of the application of the "taking" doctrine to inverse condemnation pro-
ceedings and the results of the application of the "damaging" concept.
This discrepancy involves more than a question of the degree of damage.
It is a difference of approach and philosophy, with a balancing of interests
controlling one concept and the market value test controlling the other.
Perhaps the difference between the two concepts is best illustrated by the
manner in which each concept allocates the loss. As developed above, the
"taking" test requires more than mere damage to the value of property
for a justiciable claim. To be awarded damages a landowner must be
substantially ousted from possession or substantially impaired in the en-
joyment of his property. The court is given the power to consider private
interest and public need in reaching a determination on the basis of rea-
sonableness. The objective is apparently to assure that the abnormally
sensitive person will not interfere with the public interest, but the power
of the court also includes the hidden danger of arbitrary decisions. Appar-
ently, the philosophy of the "taking" approach is analogous to that
philosophy underlying the use of zoning through police power, i.e., to
"justify those small diminutions of property rights, which, although
within the letter of constitutional protection, are necessarily incident to
4 Brief for Appellecs at 7, Jackson Municipal Airport Authority v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126
(Miss. 1966).
196 8]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the free play of the machinery of government." As in zoning, under
the "taking" doctrine the private citizen must bear some loss and some
inconvenience for the public good.
As a contrast to this, the damaging concept eliminates any question of
degree. Proponents of this doctrine would maintain that since the public
is the beneficiary of the rights taken or the damage done, the public should
bear the cost of their acquisition, whatever the price. The "damage"
approach seems superior to that of a "taking" for several reasons. (1) The
"damage" approach eliminates the possibility of arbitrary decisions, since
reliance on market value produces a more objective procedure for deter-
mining the rights of the parties involved. The litigant is therefore in a
better position to judge the merits of his complaint. (2) As the Martin
opinion points out, the "damaging" approach has a built-in procedure
for balancing the interests involved. If an individual is abnormally sensi-
tive to noise or other side effects from surrounding airports, the decline
in the value of the land will not be proportionate to that individual's own
personal suffering, which suffering should not be confused with the con-
stitutional issue of property rights.' Therefore, the balancing of inter-
ests in the "damaging" test eliminates the confusion of tort and constitu-
tional principles one finds in the "taking" approach. (3) The "market-
value" test brings the decision of the inverse condemnation cases within
the letter and spirit of the state constitutions. The "taking" concept ap-
parently assumes that small claims are not important enough for the
public interest to be burdened with, concluding that the public interest
requires that small claims be denied while large ones be paid. However,
the whole purpose of adding the "damaging" clause was to insure a broader
framework of recovery for landowners, without regard to the size of
the claim. (4) There is the inequity of one individual's paying twice for
the public's benefit, i.e., once through taxes and again through the loss
suffered.
The damaging concept is not without its limitations, however. Not only
will appraisal of property be more difficult, but "to accept it would give
rise to a multiplicity of claims whenever a public improvement was con-
structed, many doubtless fanciful, but nontheless difficult to meet, and
might render the construction of public improvements so inordinately
expensive as to retard the development of the state. '
Nevertheless, it is submitted that such losses are as much a part of the
cost of public facilities as the materials required to construct the runways
and the full cost should be borne by the public at large. Hence, it is not
necessary that some inconvenience be borne without compensation where
that inconvenience results in a measurable decline in the market value of
property which can be proven in court.
Linda A. Whitley
'This was the policy statement of Holmes, C. J., in Bent v. Emery, 53 N.E. 910, 911 (Mass.
1899).
' Martin v. Settle, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (Wash. 1964).
" 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 6.441 (1).
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Tariffs - Oversales -. Civil Remedy
Oversales, "the failure of air carriers to accommodate at flight time
passengers holding confirmed reserved tickets on the flight because space
is not available,"' is an important problem facing the airline industry to-
day. "The oversale problem is perhaps the most aggravating and traumatic
inconvenience that a passenger can be subjected to . . ."' Although "the
number of passengers holding confirmed reserved space who are denied
boarding is not large relative to total enplanements, the number is sub-
stantial in absolute terms." To the airlines, oversold situations mean loss
of fares, inefficient use of equipment, and damage to their respective images.
To a businessman, it could mean the loss of an important transaction.
Although the entire problem has been broadly attacked by both the air-
line industry and the CAB, plaintiffs have usually sought recovery for
damages from oversales either upon contract or tort principles.
I. THE COURTS' CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM
In those cases in which the action was based on breach of contract,' the
oversold passenger's recovery has been limited to compensatory damages
(the sum of the ticket price and excess baggage assessment paid5). In
denying recovery for consequential or special damages, the courts have
reasoned as follows: All tickets are sold subject to the conditions of con-
tract printed on the ticket and to the tariffs on file with the CAB.' The
passenger is charged, as a matter of law, with notice of these provisions
which form an integral part of the contract. One such provision disclaims
any duty on the part of the airline to insure that the passenger arrives
at his destination by a given time, e.g., the typical "no particular time is
fixed for the commencement or completion of carriage."8 It is a general
rule of contract that:
'CAB Release, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR-109, CAB Docket No. 16563 (10 Jan.
1967).
'CAB Press Release No. 67-170, 382-6031 (1967).
a Supra note I at 2. The Board said information before it shows that about 50,000 confirmed
reserved space passengers were denied boarding on flights in domestic trunk and local services car-
riers in both 1963 and 1964.
'National Airlines, Inc. v. Allsopp, 182 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1950); Trammell v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.S.C. 1955); Jonse v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 157 P.2d 728
(Wash. 1945).
, National Airlines, Inc. v. Allsopp, 182 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1950). "Recognizing that it
had breached its contract by not providing plaintiff with the passage it had contracted to give
him, defendant paid into court the full amount plaintiff had paid for his ticket and for excess
baggage." The court found this to be the extent of the airline's liability.
OToepfer, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, 135 F. Supp. 671 (D.C. Okla. 1955); Mustard v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 338 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696 (Mass. 1959); New York & Honduras Rosario
Min. Co. v. Riddle Airlines, Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1957), aff'd, 149 N.E.2d 93 (1958).
'Turoff v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 319 (D.C. 11. 1955); Shortley v. Northwest-
ern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1952); Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp.
691 (D.C. N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Jones v. Northwest Airlines, 157
P.2d 728 (Wash. 1945).
'Paragraph 7 of Conditions of Contract of the standard IATA ticket.
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[S]pecial damages cannot be recovered in an action ex contractit unless the
defendant had notice of the circumstance from which they [the damages]
might reasonably be expected to result at the time the parties entered into
the contract, as the effect of allowing such damages would be to add to the
terms of the contract another element of damages not contemplated by the
parties.9
This view is in accord with the basic contract principle as initially stated
in Hadley v. Baxendale." But even if the special circumstances of a given
situation have been communicated to the airlines, a new and different con-
tract would not result because "the carrier [cannot] bind itself by con-
tract to a greater obligation than permitted under its tariffs."'1 Common
carriers "are bound to serve all who come at uniform rates for like services,
and . . . cannot withdraw or modify their terms, when appraised of
special danger of loss. ' ' "a As a matter of law, they are held to one standard,
one duty of care to all passengers who pay the one price for their services.
Therefore, the carriers cannot be made liable for the consequential dam-
ages arising from the unique situation of an individual party, even when
the special circumstances have been communicated to the carrier.
The oversold passenger has not been any more successful in obtaining
consequential damages when he has based his relief on tort principles. In
Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.'" the defendant airline
prevented plaintiffs, who were Negroes, from reboarding and continuing
to their destination. The plaintiffs brought suit in a federal district court,
charging that the defendant's refusal to carry them was a malicious and
wilfull violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which prohibits all discrimi-
nation by an air carrier.' While no provision of the act grants an individual
the right to recover for damages for injuries caused him by violation of the
Act, the court of appeals relying on previous decisions where a civil right
had been implied from a criminal statute, 5 held that the criminal statute
involved herein implied a new federal civil right for the protection of a
specific class of people, of which the plaintiffs were members.
In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.," the Fitzgerald decision was
'Trammell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.S.C. 1955).
'°156 Rev. R. 145 (Ex. 1854).
11 4 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1073 (rev. ed. 1937). This is no longer strictly true
as to carriage covered by the Warsaw Convention. Article 22, Sec. (1) of Warsaw provides:
'Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of
liability."
An argument might be made, as to a Warsaw flight, that if the carrier sold a ticket to a
passenger who had communicated the special circumstance to the carrier, and if that passenger was
prevented from making the flight because it was oversold, then the carrier would be liable to the
full extent of the special circumstances communicated to it.
" C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 570 (193 5); see also Note, The Rule in Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, 16 Law Q. Rev. 275 (1900).
"SFitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
14Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 404(b), 52 Stat. 973 reads in part: "No air carrier . . .
shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
in any respect whatsoever."
IsSee, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1945); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1947).
"'Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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applied to an oversold situation. In that case, the plaintiff held a con-
firmed reservation on the defendant's flight from St. Louis to Los Angeles.
Although the plaintiff had complied with all tariff requirements, such as
confirming his reservation, the defendant airline oversold the flight and
consequently "bumped" the plaintiff in favor of a first-class passenger
who had purchased his ticket subsequent to the plaintiff. The court, recog-
nizing the validity of the federal cause of action implied in the Fitzgerald
decision, held that the defendant's action constituted unjust discrimina-
tion in violation of section 404 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
In addition to being the first case to apply the prohibition against discrimi-
nation to an oversold situation, the Wills decision was also significant as
to the matter of damages. Because the plaintiff was inconvenienced only
to the extent of a four-hour delay on a Sunday afternoon in arriving at
his destination and the cost of a telephone call to inform his wife of his
delay, the court limited the award for compensatory damages to the
amount of the telephone call ($1.60). However, the court awarded him
$5000 as punitive damages. This was the first instance in which a court
allowed punitive damages in a case involving a federal cause of action
implied from a criminal statute."
Whether the cases based on contract and tort are still valid is doubtful.
One writer"8 has suggested that, in view of the doctrine of primary juris-
diction," these prior cases would not be applicable to instances of oversell-
ing today because the CAB has since adopted tariff rules"0 covering over-
sold situations. Even if this cause of action would still be applicable, the
amount of recovery that the courts could grant might now be limited to
the amount of recovery provided by the relevant tariff provisions. 1 Al-
though there have been no further cases in this area, two courts,2 in dicta,
have declared this right to still exist (although they made no mention of
the matter of damages). However, before an oversold passenger could
seek recovery on the basis of these decisions, the element of discrimination
must exist, viz., a passenger boarded on the flight must have purchased his
ticket subsequent to the plaintiff.
II. THE INDUSTRY'S AND THE CAB's CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM
At different times the industry and the CAB have, together or sepa-
rately, sought various solutions to the problem of oversales. A consideration
of their attempted solutions requires, first of all, an appreciation of the
causes of oversales:
" See Note, Civil Aeronautics Act-Discrimination-Privale Cause of Action for Punitive
Damages, 60 MIcti. L. REV. 798 (1962).
I1 Id.
"9This doctrine provides that when Congress has created a regulatory agency to regulate a
particular area, the courts, state and federal, are without power or jurisdiction to grant relief to
persons complaining of an act done, if that act is within the area of control of such agency;
see Adler v. Chicago & So. Air Line, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
" See discussion of tariffs, in the text, infra.
" See, e.g., Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Toepfer, Inc. v.
Braniff Airways, 135 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Wittenberg v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 126
F. Supp. 459 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Mach v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1949).
"Flores v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F. Supp. 402 (D. Puerto Rico 1966); Stough
v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 55 Ill. App. 2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
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(1) substitution of lower capacity aircraft because of maintenance or other
operational considerations; (2) errors committed by personnel of the carrier
denying boarding to the passenger, by personnel of other carriers, and by
travel agency personnel, and (3) breakdown or defects in communication,
computing and other equipment used in processing reservations.23
Other causes are "reservation practices such as 'free-sales' and block
ticketing" and, in certain situations, intentional overselling and overbook-
ing.' No-shows'--passengers who do not use their confirmed reservations
-are one of the main causes of overselling; reducing the incidence of
no-shows would greatly reduce the economic pressure on the airlines to
intentionally oversell.
In trying to solve the no-show problem the airlines have tried three
approaches: (1) assessment of a penalty on the no-show passenger; (2)
establishment of a minimum time limit (MTL) before a flight in which a
passenger must purchase the ticket he has reserved; and (3) requirement
of reconfirmation by the passengers of their intention to use their tickets.
Assessment of penalties was first tried in 1948, but lasted only a few
months because of non-compliance by some airlines.2 In 1954, a no-show
penalty (20 percent of the one-way fare) applicable solely to coach travel
was adopted and a reconfirmation requirement was applied to first-class
passengers.' Soon thereafter, the airlines dropped the reconfirmation re-
quirement because it only burdened those who did fly and "had no effect
on the no-shows." '
In 19 5S, the Air Traffic Conference,2 9 after the CAB had brought pres-
sure to bear on the carriers to find a solution to the no-show problem,"
appointed a special committee that suggested extending the penalty
assessment to all classes of passengers. The Conference rejected the sug-
gestion"2 and later eliminated the then existing penalty assessment on coach
service." Thereafter, the CAB advised the industry that it would take
action if the industry could not agree on a solution to the no-show prob-
lem." The industry and the CAB finally agreed upon a three-phase plan
involving MTL, reconfirmation, and a $3.00 penalty on no-shows." In
"Proposed CAB Eco. Reg. 5 109, 32 Fed. Reg. 459 (10 Jan. 1967).
" Id. It was said in AVIATION WEEK, 23 July 1966, at 38 that -'[o verbooking and overselling
flights is a practice developed by some airlines as a calculated risk. Flights are overbooked and
oversold in the expectation that no-shows will reduce the number of reservations sold to the
number of seats available on the flight." This fact has been recognized by the CAB. "No-shows
. . . were conceded by the Board as probably exerting economic pressure on carriers to indulge
in overbooking." AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHiNOLOGY, 23 Jan. 1967, at 39.
' One study showed that no-shows amounted to 16% of total passengers enplaned; see AvIA-
TION WEEK, 9 July 1956, at 38.
"AVIATION WEEK, 26 Sept. 1955, at 20.
27AvIATtON WEEK, 2 May 1955, at 98.
8 Id. Actually, no-shows increased 50% to 60% after the airlines discontinued the recon-
firmation practice; see AVIATION WEEK, 8 Aug. 1955, at 101.
" The Air Traffic Association is divided in working groups such as the Public Relations Con-
ference and the Finance and Accounting Conference. The Air Traffic Conference is the working
grou devoted to the problems such as scheduling, reservations, etc.
AVIATION WEEK, 2 May 1955, at 98.
a' AVIATION WEEK, 22 Aug. 1955, at 101.
asAVIATION WEEK, 26 Sept. 1955, at 20.
as AVIATION WEEK, 18 June 1956, at 25.
3 AvIATION WEEK, 9 July 1956, at 38; AVIATION WEEK, 27 Aug. 1956, at 43; AVIATION
WEEK, 28 Jan. 1957, at 40; AVIATION WEEK, 18 Nov. 1957, at 41.
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1958, the Air Traffic Conference once again voted to drop the penalty,"
but by 1962 the penalty was back in vogue. The CAB in that year agreed
to a no-show penalty of 50 percent of the first unused flight coupon with
a minimum of $5.00 and a maximum of $40.00, ° which proved effective
in handling the no-show problem." However, in spite of its success and
the CAB's desire for permanent adoption," it was discontinued in 1963
primarily because of the public sentiment against it."
In 1962, when the industry proposed a penalty of 50 percent of the
ticket price, with a minimum of $5.00 and a maximum of $40.00 on no-
shows, the CAB agreed, provided the industry would agree to a like
penalty to be paid by them to an oversold passenger denied boarding."
This tariff, which granted compensation to an oversold passenger, further
provided that the airline must (1) transport the oversold passenger on its
next flight on which space was available at no additional cost to the
passenger, regardless of the class of service, or (2) re-route the passenger
on another carrier at no additional cost, whichever would provide the
earliest arival at the passenger's destination, next stopover point, or trans-
fering point.
In January 1967, the CAB proposed substantial rule changes in this
area,' 1 which were adopted 3 August 1967. The Board, realizing the "sub-
stantial inconvenience and hardships" suffered by an oversold passenger,
felt that it should "take positive steps to assure prompt, effective, and
adequate compensation" to such passengers. As it believed that the previ-
ous level of compensation "fell far short of being adequate," the Board
changed Section 250 of the Economic Regulations to provide for compensa-
tion equal to 100 percent of the value of the first remaining flight coupon
with a minimum of $25.00 and a maximum of $200.' Significantly, the
new rules also provide, inter alia, that the carriers must file with the CAB
(1) priority rules and criteria used in determining which oversold pas-
senger will be denied boardage," and (2) reports of all overbooked pas-
"5 Only 3 of the 25 confeernce members wanted to drop the plan. The other 22 had to go along
for competitive reasons. However, they did appeal to the CAB for help to retain the plan, but to
no avail. It was discontinued; see AVIATION WEEK, 4 Aug. 1958, at 40.
3 AvIATION WEEK, 15 Jan. 1962, at 38.
"This penalty cut no-shows 25-45%; see AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9 July
1962, at 28.
" AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1 Oct. 1962, at 30.
"'See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 23 Jan. 1967, at 39.
" See AVIATION WEEK, 15 Jan. 1962, at 31. This compensation was considered to be liquidated
damages, which if accepted, would constitute full compensation for all actual or anticipatory
damages incurred or to be incurred by the passenger. CAB Tariff No. 43, Sec. VI; CAB, Economic
Regulations S 250 (1967).
"'Proposed CAB Eco. Reg. § 109, 32 Fed. Reg. 459 (10 Jan. 1967).
41 Id. at 460.
43 Id.
4Id.
4' This provision will not apply to persons in international travel if the overselling airline
can arrange for the oversold passenger to arrive at his next stopover point not later than four
hours after the planned arrival of the plane on which he held a ticket. Nor will this apply to a
person in domestic flight, if the delay is less than two hours in getting to his stopover point. Nor
does this tariff apply if the passenger is denied boardage because of (1) Government requisition of
space, or (2) substitution of equipment of lesser capacity required by operation and/or safety
reason. CAB, Economic Regulations S 250.6 (1967).
"CAB, Economic Regulations S 250.3 (1967).
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sengers.
These new rules will, hopefully, do much to solve various aspects of the
oversold problem." They provide compensation to an injured passenger
that is probably more commensurate with the injury actually suffered by
him. As they extract a greater penalty from the overselling airline, it may
be influenced to exercise tighter controls on its procedures. Of equal sig-
nificance, the new rules will provide the CAB with more complete knowl-
edge of the problem, which will enable it to determine whether different
regulations are necessary and if so, the form they should take.
The problem of no-shows still exist; it is in turn the main cause of the
problem of overbooking, the complete solution of which must necessarily
direct itself to the former. A no-show situation may arise (1) when a
passenger, unable to use his reservation, fails to notify the airline or, (2)
when a passenger, reserving space on several airlines, decides only at the
last minute which flight he will take (multiple booking)." In spite of
these factors, studies show the incidence of no-shows to be within the
airlines' ability to control." Consequently, the industry should once again
direct itself to this problem and take action to, at least, reinstate the pen-
alty and if the airlines cannot reach unanimity on this course of action,
the CAB should intervene.
As to the other causes of overbooking mentioned above (operational
considerations and the human element) these probably cannot be con-
trolled to any greater degree than that which exists at the present time.
However, the importance of the communications breakdown aspect will
undoubtedly become less important, as data processing equipment and tech-
niques continue to improve.' At work now, or soon to be, are such de-
velopments as (1) the changeover to a completely computerized reserva-
tion system;"2 (2) the connection of travel agents' offices directly to the
airline's reservation computer;" (3) a joint computer system for all inter-
line booking;"' and (4) the proposed industry-wide computer system."
Such developments should contribute significantly to the control and im-
provement of the oversales problem.
David L. Briscoe
4 CAB, Economic Regulations 5 250.10 (1967).
" These new rules, "the Board believes, will result in tightening up reservation and ticketing
procedures with a resultant reduction in the number of oersales." CAB Press Release No. 67-170,
392-6039 (1967) at 4.
4 See Ruppenthal, Bumping the Pasrnger, 190 NATION 551 (1960). Multiple bookings, in
some instances, are caused by the %ery thing des~ined to counteract them, i.e., oversales. Realizing
that airlines oversell flights to protect themrslves aiinst the contingcncic of no-shows, the pas-
senger wanting to protect himelf from the contiogcncy that he may be denied boardage because
the plane is oversold will make multiple bookings to assure himself of transportation.
SSupra notes 29, 33, and 36.
. [T]he use of more advanced computers in the handling of reservations should result in
a further decrease in oversales."
"
2
See AVIATION WEEK, 14 Aug. 1961, at 45.
sa See The Wall Street Journal, 3 Aug. 1967, at 6. col. I.
"See AVIATION WEEK, 14 Aug. 1961, at 46.
"s AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TE(.HNOI.ocY, 10 July 1967, at 40.
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Federal Aviation Act - Statutory Interpretation - Remedies
The plaintiff, who was injured when the private plane in which he was
traveling crashed while attempting a night landing, brought suit against
the pilot and co-owners of the plane. The petition alleged that the aircraft
was operated in violation of several regulations,' which violations proxi-
mately caused the crash. The plaintiff further asserted (a) that the federal
court had jurisdiction' because the action arose under the Federal Aviation
Act3 of 1958 and (b) that the court could imply a remedy therefrom.
Held, Dismissed: The court will not imply a federal civil remedy from the
violation of a Civil Air Regulation of safety. Because the plaintiff failed
to state a federal cause of action upon which relief could be granted, he
must seek his remedy in the state courts. Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp.
445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
While some federal courts have refused to allow a federal remedy for
actions based on violations of regulatory acts which do not expressly pro-
vide a means of relief, other federal courts have based a remedy on regula-
tory acts even where they do not provide for express relief. In the latter
situation the courts have implied that Congress intended to create a civil
remedy.
In Texas d Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,' the Supreme Court first implied a
cause of action for a statutory violation when a railroad employee was
injured by the railroad's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.'
Since then, this and other acts have been found not to imply a private
cause of action.
One approach courts have used to determine whether an act was meant
to provide, indirectly, for civil remedies, is to consider legislative intent.
For example, in Jacobson v. New York, N.H. d H.R., in which the
Supreme Court decided that the Safety Appliance Act, rather than creat-
ing a new right, only imposed a higher standard of care in suits based upon
the common law, the Court examined the construction of the Act in
order to determine the intent of Congress. It concluded that if Congress
had intended to create a new cause of action in favor of parties not cov-
14 C.F.R. § 61.47(b) (1967):
No person may act as pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers during
the period beginning I hour after sunset and ending 1 hour before sunrise unless,
within the preceding 90 days, he has made at least five takeoffs and five landings
to a full stop during that period of the day. This period does not apply to operations
requiring an airline transport certificate.
[W]here the complaint . . . is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible excep-
tions [where the claim is immaterial or insubstantial] . . . must assume jurisdiction
to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant
relief as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy.
Be!l v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946).
a 7 2 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. S 1 (1946).
4241 U.S. 33 (1916).
527 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
6206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
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ered by the Employers' Liability Acts,' it would have included provisions
regarding venue, jurisdiction, statute of limitations, damages, and bene-
ficiaries. In determining legislative intent, courts have also looked to the
existence of Congressionally created agencies which administer the regula-
tions of the act involved. In Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern
Public Serv. Co.," the Supreme Court did not imply a cause of action from
the Federal Power Act" reasoning that since Congress gave the Federal
Power Commission the right to set the rates, it did not intent to provide
for court inquiry into the rates. Also, some courts have determined con-
gressional intent by applying a rule of construction to the text of the
statute, e.g., the rule of "expressiounis"'' was applied to the Motor Carrier
Act,"5 which provided only for criminal penalties and injunctive remedies,
but was silent as to any private remedy for a violation of any of its pro-
visions."1
In those instances in which a court has extended a civil remedy to a per-
son injured by a defendant's breach of a federal regulation that did not
expressly provide for such relief, it has always found the defendant to be
in the class of people for whose protection the regulation was enacted.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that:
[T]he court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose if sound to be exclusively or in part to protect a class of persons
which includes the one whose interest is invaded.... .3
The courts have interpreted this statement as a creation of a new cause of
action rather than raising the existing standards of a previous cause of
action. Consequently, this section alone has been used as a basis for im-
plying a cause of action." In those situations where there is a lack of a
previous common law duty, some courts have been inclined to imply a
cause of action. Thus, it has been held that the Federal Communications
Act' created both criminal and civil liability for the publication of an
intercepted telephone conversation because there was no previous common
law remedy for such an act. Similarly, in Turnstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen,1' the Supreme Court found that the breach of a duty
created by the Railroad Labor Act" was sufficient to imply a federal action
even though there was no previous common law duty. However, the court
limited the concept to violations of the Act in which no administrative
remedies were available. Finally, many courts have construed regulatory
' 35 Stat. 64, 45 U.S.C. S 51 el. seq. (1908).
'341 U.S. 246 (1951).
'41 Star. 1063, 16 U.S.C. SS 791a-825r (1920).
10 Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
"' 54 Stat. 899 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. SS 301-27 (1964),
"* Consolidated Freight-Ways, Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
13 RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF TORTS S 286 (1965).
"'Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Kardon v. National
Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
1- 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
" 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
1748 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. SS 151 el. seq. (1934).
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acts as sources of implied actions when the activities involved was inter-
state, viz. when a uniform remedy was desirable. 8
In the area of air regulations, the courts have generally used one of the
aforementioned rationales in order to imply a cause of action. For example,
in Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire .Rubber Co."' the court followed the Re-
statement view and implied a civil cause of action from a violation of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926,8 when the plaintiff was in the class of people
for whose protection the regulation was enacted. Another criteria employed
in the air law area is the absence of an administrative agency or agency
authority to award civil damages for violations of the Federal Aviation
Act. In Wills v. Trans World Airlines21 the court stated:
[T]he first consideration which argues that a Federal cause in the behalf of
the passenger fulfills a major purpose of the act is the fact that, although
the statute confers upon the administrative agency power to investigate and
render prospective relief to protect from impending statutory violation, there
is no administrative authority to award damages or other relief to a passenger
for past wrongs.'
The Wills court, which found the basis for the federal cause of action was
a section" of the Federal Aviation Act forbidding discrimination or undue
preference as to passengers, relied in part on Fitzgerald v. Pan American
World Airways." There, the plaintiffs alleged that they were removed from
a flight because of their race and the court implied a civil remedy after
application of the criteria of congressional intent and a national interest
in uniformity.
In summary, the courts have used the following standards or tests in
implying a cause of action from a violation of a civil air regulation: (1)
legislative intent, as evidenced by the absence of an administrative agency
or authority to provide a relief; (2) the Restatement (Second) of Torts
rule; (3) the absence of a state court remedy; or (4) a national interest
in uniformity.
In those cases where courts have refused to imply a federal cause of
action from the Federal Aviation Act, they have employed additional
standards. In Dennis v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc.,' where the action
was commenced in a state court and removed to the federal court, it
was held that if the cause of action to be implied from a violation of
the Federal Aviation Act was subject to the removal jurisdiction of the
federal courts, no civil remedy could be implied, i.e., there must be exclu-
18 See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162
F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).9 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
2544 Stat. 568.
21200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
22 200 F. Supp. at 364.
23 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. 1374(b) (1964):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or reasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, oi description of
traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable
prejudice of disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
24229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1955).
22 176 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
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sire jurisdiction before the court would even consider whether to imply a
federal cause of action. Additionally, some cases have refused to imply a
federal cause of action when the plaintiff has brought suit for a deceased
relative, because they reason the plaintiff has no right to sue in the ab-
sence of a federal wrongful death statute."
In the present case, the court took encouragement from existing case law,
particularly from Dennis in regard to absence of exclusive federal juris-
diction and other decisions involving the lack of a federal wrongful death
statute. It distinguished Wills and Fitzgerald because in those cases the
state court remedies were inadequate and, thus, a federal remedy was needed
to correct violations of civil rights sections of the Act. The court also de-
clined to follow Neiswonger.
[W]ben no national interest compels that certain litigation be brought to
the federal court, when a wholly satisfactory state forum is available to the
parties, and when the Constitution of the United States and the federal
statutes permit the federal court to choose whether to receive the case, there
is much to be said for withholding a federal remedy. [Emphasis added.]."
In addition, the court reasoned that were a federal cause of action im-
plied, the federal courts would be required to develop a body of common
law rules to deal with the issues of last clear chance, contributory negli-
gence, proximate cause and others.
However, in declining to imply a remedy, the court did not take into
consider some matters that may be materialized in other decisions, e.g.,
(1) a national interest in uniformity and (2) an inadequacy in plaintiff's
remedies. This national interest has been emphasized in two ways. First,
as discussed previously in the cases dealing with interstate activities, the
courts have implied a cause of action from regulatory acts in order to
obtain uniform results-both private and public aviation are ever-increas-
ing interstate activities which demand this uniformity of regulation."
Second, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act in order to insure and
promote safety in the field of aviation through the use of uniform and
higher safety standards." As Fitzgerald noted, "Congress sought uniformity
in the practices of those subject to this Act.""0
Another significant matter that the court failed to consider in detail
was the possibility of an inadequate remedy for a plaintiff. The court
stated that, "[n]o inadequacies in the state remedy have been called to
our attention, and we are aware of none,"'" but, there was an inadequacy
2Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Fernandez v.
Linea Aeropostal, 156 F. Supp. 94, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1957): "The act .. . might establish a standard
of care" where no wrongful death but just an injury. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 355
S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1962).
27Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
2 "The fastest growing segment of civil aviation for some years has been general aviation
(nonairline & nonmilitary aviation)." FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY, 8TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 81 (1966).
29 "Aviation safety is the Federal Aviation Agency's primary mission .... FEDERAL AVIA-
TION AGENCY, 8TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 1 (1966).
30229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1955).
3'250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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in the state court remedy: the lack of a co-ownership liability statute in
Wisconsin. In opposition to motions to dismiss, the plaintiff urged the
application of Sec. 101" of the Federal Aviation Act, which provides for
the liability of absent co-owners of aircraft. Since plaintiff's attempt to
bring in additional defendants indicated the defendant-pilot's inability to
satisfy a possible judgment, certainly an unsatisfied judgment against an
insolvent defendant would be an "inadequate remedy."
The Moungey court also left unexplored a further possible deficiency
in the state court remedies. As stated in a legal periodical relied on by the
court, "[I]n some areas the inadequacy of the state court remedy may
lie not so much in their individual deficiencies as in their local nature and
diversity."' The diversity of state court approaches to proof and liability
has resulted in different conclusions in airline crash cases. In particular,
rules of evidence have an important effect on the outcome of negligence
cases involving airplane crashes because of the inherent limitations of
proof, e.g., destruction of the aircraft and likely death of its passengers.
For example, it is well established that the use of res ispa loquitur, as an
alternative to evidentiary proof, has been generally unsuccessful in airline
crash cases." This difficulty is minor when compared to the wide diversity
of state rules concerning admissibility of the civil air regulations as evi-
dence in state courts. Some states have held that a violation of a safety
regulation is negligence per se" while a few states admit it as some evi-
dence of negligence." These differences in standards of care naturally pro-
duce different results. Similarly, in the case of uniformity some jurisdictions
have ownership liability statutes, while others do not."
Finally, the possible inability of the plaintiff to join all defendants in
one action reflects the inequity of confining him to state court. When an
accident involves as possible defendants one or two aircraft owners, the
manufacturer, and the United States Government in the operation of its
control tower facilities, where no diversity of citizenship exists between
parties, and the Government is an essential party, then federal jurisdiction
as implied from the Federal Aviation Act may be the only method of
gathering together all the defendants in one action."8
In addition to believing that the state remedy was adequate, the instant
court was of the opinion that:
"[t]he national interest in safety in civil aeronautics is adequately protected
2 72 Star. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (26) (1964): "Operation of Aircraft" or "operate aircraft"
means the use of aircraft, for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation of aircraft.
Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right
of legal control, (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to
be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of this Act.33 Comment, Inplying Civil Renedies front Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 293
(1963).
a McLarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 27 VA. L. REV. 55 (1951), in
which it is indicated that as of 1951, of 24 airline crash cases tried by plaintiffs on a res ipsa
loquitur basis, 22 had resulted in judgments for the defendants.
" Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, rev'd on other
gds., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
as Citrola v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
" L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 173 (1963).
8SId. at 531.
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by the network of statutory and administrative procedures and sanctions
expressly created by the Federal Aviation Program .... "
Although this protection is achieved by conferring upon the administra-
tive agency the power to investigate and render prospective relief, the fed-
eral court places the burden of granting relief for past violations on state
courts. This is because there is no administrative authority to award dam-
ages or other relief to those injured by past violations of the federal act.
As discussed previously, this lack of an administrative agency to award
damages is a sufficient basis for implying that Congress intended to create
a new cause of action.'
While the holding of the instant court cannot be deemed definitely in-
correct (because the state remedy was seemingly adequate) there are
strong arguments that available state court remedies, as a whole, were in-
adequate. It is submitted that a broader, more nationally-oriented outlook
by the court would have produced a result that would better protect all
of the interests of civil aeronautics. The uniform implication of a cause
of action could cure many existing deficiencies in the state court remedies
and also increase the likelihood of compliance by potential violators, who
would be faced with an additional or more uniform penalty. The least the
court could have done was to follow Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H.
R."' which imposed a higher standard of care in suits based on a common
law right. Such an approach would serve to relieve the federal court from
developing a body of common law rules and, to a lesser degree, it would
solve the problem of uniformity by imposing a higher standard of care
upon the states' common law duties. Indeed, this has been the result of
the decision in Jacobson.' If the Moungey court's rationale is followed
and the public waits until a "compelling national interest" is present, then
many people will possibly suffer from the variety of state court deficiencies.
James Lee Irish III
"250 F. Supp. at 451.
"°Supra note 22.
4'206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
"Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Dirmvant, 365 Ala. 423, 91 So. 2d 670 (1956). "After further
study we are of the opinion that a count seeking damages because of the Safety Appliance Act
need not contain the formal charge of negligence. "Cases of this kind are governed by acts of
Congress and by federal decisional law. . . . Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 1 Cir.,
206 F.2d 157." Garner v. Pacific Electric Co., 202 Cal. App. 2d 720, 21 Cal. Rptr. 352, 360
(1962).
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Sonic Booms - FTCA - Waiver Of Discretionary Exception
Plaintiff alleged that damage to his apartment building (broken win-
dows, cracks in a plaster wall, and squeaks in floors and stairways) re-
sulted from sonic booms, which were caused by the supersonic flight of
Air Force B-58 bombers. The planes were on training missions prescribed
by the Strategic Air Command Training Manual and were operated in
the Minneapolis air corridor, which extends from Minot, North Dakota,
to a point just beyond Minneapolis.' The plaintiff argued that there was
a substantial causative factor involved and that the Government was
liable either under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence2 or through
the Tucker Act on the constitutional theory of an uncompensated taking.3
Prior to the trial the Government stipulated, as a result of a motion by
the plaintiff to strike certain defenses, that the court had jurisdiction under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.4 At the trial, however, the defendant argued
that the stipulation was inapplicable, on the grounds that the court lacked
jurisdiction,' that the plaintiff failed to establish negligence under the
Federal Tort-Claims Act, and that the overflights in themselves did not
constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the Constitution. Held: There
was no jurisdictional question because the pre-trial stipulation effectively
waived the Government's "discretionary exception." Although there was
neither a taking that would justify a ruling under the Fifth Amendment
nor negligence in the operation of the aircraft, there was negligence in
placing the air corridor in its particular location for which the Govern-
ment was held to be liable. Neher v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 210 (D.
Minn. 1967).
A variety of theories have been suggested for the recovery of sonic boom
damages: strict liability, negligence, ultrahazardous activity, trespass, and
nuisance.6 However, in litigation against the United States remedies are
limited to those which are specifically permitted by it.
One method often used for the recovery of damages against the United
States is that of an uncompensated taking or inverse condemnation under
the Fifth Amendment.' The Tucker Act endows the District Court and
the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over controversies not exceeding
$10,000, if such claim is based on the Constitution, any act of Congress,
any regulation of an executive department, any express or implied con-
'An air corridor is usually twenty nautical miles wide and three hundred to six hundred
nautical miles long. The plaintiff's building is eight to ten miles from the center line of this
particular corridor.
'Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
'Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964).
"Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
'Discretionary Function Exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
6Note, Sonic Booms--Ground Damage-Theories of Recovery, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 596
(1966); Note, Federal Liability for Sonic Boom Damage, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1958).
U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides, in part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
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tract with the United States, or is the result of liquidated or unliquidated
damages which do not fall under the classification of a tort. Applying this
act through the Fifth Amendment, a civil suit may be brought against the
United States for damages caused by a taking and the Government will
not be permitted to raise the defense of sovereign immunity.
The courts usually have granted only limited recovery for damages in
this area. In 1946, what appeared to be a major breakthrough came in the
decision of United States 11. Causby, involving the frequent recurrence
of low flights by military aircraft above the plaintiff's house and chicken
farm. The Court found that these flights caused the destruction of the use
of the property as a chicken farm; it ruled that such flights must be low
and frequent before they may constitute a violation of private property
rights.9 These conclusions were reaffirmed in a more recent decision by the
Supreme Court, Griggs v. Allegheny County." Most courts have followed
these particular decisions stringently, allowing recovery only when there
is an actual trespass as the result of overflights. Without such a violation
of property rights, claims have been denied, regardless of the noise, vibra-
tion, or other discomforts which the testing of jet engines, or the landing
and taking off of jet aircraft have caused."
Because of the holding in United States v. Causby," that flights must
be frequent and low, it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment remedy is
not available in the instant case. Flights at 30,000 feet could never be
thought of as "low," particularly when flights over cities are only required
to be 1,000 feet above the tallest object." Neither could these flights be
deemed "frequent" when they occurred approximately once per week for
a short period of eight weeks.
An alternative means for recovering damages from the United States
is the Federal Tort Claims Act." Congress provided this remedy in order
to permit the suit to be brought at the plaintiff's residence, to lessen the
case load of the Court of Claims, to speed the determination of such cases,
'328 U.S. 256 (1946).
'United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences
which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The air-
space, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.
. . . Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.
"369 U.S. 84 (1962).
"Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
In the Batten case, particularly, the court defines the limits on the interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment. At 583 it is stated:
In construing and applying this constitutional provision the federal courts have
long and consistently recognized the distinction between a taking and consequential
damages. In Transportation Company v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642, 25 L.Ed. 336,
the Supreme Court held that governmental activities which do not directly encroach
on private property are not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
even though the consequence of such acts may impair the use of the property. The
principle was repeated in United States v. Willrw River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
510, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101, the court saying that "damage alone gives courts
no power to require compensation."
1"328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13 14 C.F.R. SS 91.79, 91.119 (1967). Courts have considered this area above the 1,000 foot
mark to be in the public domain. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
428 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1964).
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and also to relieve Congress of the burden of considering private bills.'"
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable if a private
person under the same or similar circumstances would also be liable. How-
ever, certain exceptions extensively limit the meaning of the prior sen-
tence. Perhaps the most important of these limitations is the "discretionary
function" exception,'" the effect of which is to differentiate between the
operational and planning levels of administration, viz., the Government
will not be liable for acts performed at the planning level. 7
Several decisions have considered the difference between a planning and
an operational function. However, no rule of application has yet been
devised which clearly separates the two; nor has any consistent trend de-
veloped to point out which acts will be defined as planning functions and
which will be considered operational. However, a stricter interpretation
of the planning function has been inferred in circumstances involving
personal injuries that result from a non-military activity or an activity
that does not involve the interests of the national defense. Judgments re-
sulting from negligence in the performance of air traffic control functions,
which are civil in nature, can be contrasted with those handed down as
the result of supersonic flight damage, a military function carried on in
the interest of national defense. While the former decisions usually allow
recovery, the latter decisions are to the contrary." The functions are parallel
because they both involve decisions of federal employees acting under a
stated code of regulations, but the courts have found that one function is
operational while the other is planning." In the instant case it was un-
'528 U.S.C.A. § 1346 n.7 (1967).
1628 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
"Discretionary Function Exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
" Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, reb. denied, 346 U.S. 841 (1953), reh. denied, 347
U.S. 924 (1954).
It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judg-
ment and decision there is discretion.
Dalehite v. United States, supra at 35-36.
"Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Union Trust
Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii
1965), afi'd, 281 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967); Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D.
N.Y. 1964); Aero Enterprise, Inc. v. American Flyers, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Tex. 1958);
Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D.N.D. 1965).
°In Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), suit was brought on
behalf of decedent for damages of his death resulting from an airplane crash caused by wake tur-
bulence. The traffic controller had given all warnings prescribed by the federal manual, yet the
government was found liable for the failure of its employee to go beyond the manual and give
warnings which he should have known to be proper. Thus the court held that the function of an
air traffic controller is operational. In contrast, in Huslander v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 1004
(W.D.N.Y. 1964), suit was brought for injuries suffered from a sonic boom, which caused an
open window to slam, the glass to break, and plaintiff to be cut. The Government pleaded the
defense of "discretionary function;" proved its case based upon affidavits which established that the
Air Force Manual provided for supersonic flights and that the pilot was not to go into such flight,
unless specifically ordered, or in his discretion, it was necessary because of an emergency situation.
The court found that the regulations as set out in the Air Force Manual, as well as the judgment
of the pilot in time of emergency, both fall within the confines of Sec. 2680(a), the discretionary
exception, protecting the Government from liability by denying the plaintiff the benefit of suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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necessary to decide whether or not the function was operational because
the defendant, by prior stipulation, had waived its "discretionary function"
defense."
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act negligence must be established be-
fore recovery of any alleged damages will be permitted." In the instant
matter plaintiff failed to carry the burden of establishing that the flights
were incorrectly executed, i.e., the evidence showed that the flights were
performed in a non-negligent manner, at the proper altitude, in conform-
ance with Air Force Regulation 55-34, which governs such activity. How-
ever, because there was evidence which established that such flights could
have been performed in sparsely populated areas at no added inconven-
ience, and with the same military benefit, the court found that the de-
cision to place the supersonic corridor over a densely populated area was
negligent."
" The Government sought to establish that the exceptions listed in Sec. 2680 of the Federal
Tort Claims Act were jurisdictional and could not be waived, thus rendering the court powerless
to adjudicate the matter. The basis of this line of defense rests upon two appellate court opinions
and a number of recent district court decisions. The substance of this argument is that Congress
has established a limited area in which claims will be heard by the district court; if the subject
matter is outside this exclusive area, the court lacks jurisdiction;'the language used in the intro-
duction of Sec. 2680 is self-limiting and jurisdictional in tone, thus it cannot be waived and may
be raised at anytime during the proceedings. Sickman v: United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 843, veb. denied, 342 U.S. 874 (1951).
Congress has denied jurisdiction to the district courts for the adjudication (1) of
any claim based upon an act or an omission of a government employee, exercising due
care, whether or not the statute or regulation is valid, and (2) of any claim based
upon the performance or failure to perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a government agency or employee, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
Sickman v. United States, supra at 619. In United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956),
cei. denied, 355 U.S. 801 (1957) at 652 it was stated, "it seems obvious that the exception to
Federal Tort Claims Act liability contained in 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2680 are jurisdictional." See also
Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 217 (ND. Cal. 1964); Sisley v. United States, 202 F.
Supp. 273 (D. Alas. 1962). However, the argument raised by the plaintiff and adopted by the
court interprets Sec. 2680 as mere language of limitation in the nature of an affirmative defense
that must be pleaded and proven; this reasoning is supported by decisions at both the district
and circuit court levels. Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 940 (1950).
In our view, Sec. 1346(b) conferred general jurisdiction of the subject matter of
claims coming within its purview, and the exceptions referred to are available to
the government as a defense only when aptly pleaded and proven.
Stewart v. United States, supra at 519. In this decision the court refers to Ex Parte Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 138, 140 (1950), where the court speaks of Sec. 1346(b):
The Act does confer district court jurisdiction generally over claims for money
damages against the United States founded on negligence. . . . This confers juris-
diction to render judgment upon all such claims. But it does not say that all claims
must be allowed. Jurisdiction is necessary to deny a claim on its merits as a matter
of law as much as to adjudge that liability exists. . . . Jurisdiction of the defendant
now exists where the defendant was immune from suit before; it remains for courts,
in exercise of their jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim is recognizable in
law.
Stewart v. United States, supra at 519. Smith v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1957)
states at 612:
In addition, sec. 1346(b) has been construed as conferring general jurisdiction on
federal courts of the subject matter of claims coming within its purview and that
the exceptions referred to in sec. 2680(a) are available to the Government as a de-
fense only when aptly pleaded and proven.
"5Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
'5Neher v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 210, 217 (D. Minn. 1967).
The record shows no compelling necessity to plot supersonic corridors over or near
permanent bases or populated areas. Thus, I conclude the United States was negligent
in designating and using a supersonic corridor over the Minneapolis-St. Paul area
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The problems raised in this decision are related to the whole area of
damages suffered as the result of noise, vibration or shock waves. Little re-
covery has been obtained, except in those instances where damages are
accompanied by a physical trespass, or where Government immunities
have been waived. Because the "discretionary function" exception was
waived, this decision is admittedly rare and unlikely to recur. However,
as the occurrence of sonic booms (with their accompanying vibrations,
noise and shock waves) increases, many courts have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the present situation and declared a need for some form of recom-
pense." A suggested answer is strict liability; the Government is carrying
on an activity from which damages will result, yet continues it. It seems
only fitting that such conduct should bear the cost of its consequences.'
Joe W. Sbeehan
during 1962 [Emphasis added.].
Although the court did not discuss the elements of negligence, it held that the deefndant was
negligent. The duty and standard of conduct to be applied are those which are to be inferred
from the term of negligence itself. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, S 53 (3d ed. 1964):
In other words, "duty" is a question of whether the defendant is under any obliga-
tion for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is
always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light
of apparent risk.
Thus, what the court is saying is that because there is "no compelling necessity" to administer
the flight tests in this particular area, the defendant's conduct became unreasonable in light of the
apparent risk of sonic boom damages. The court rejected defendant's claim that there was a lack
of scientific cause and pointed out that the legal or proximate cause is not limited to the scien-
tific cause but more inclusive, for it is the "eficient cause, or the one which necessarily sets in
operation the factors which accomplish the damage." The court considered the damages to have
been sufficiently established to justify an award in the amount of $750.
24Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962); Wallace v. United States,
142 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1944).
s Such has been the theory applied where ultrahazardous activities are carried on. RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS SS 519-20 (1934); W. PRosSER, LAW OF TORTS S 77 (3d ed. 1964).
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Insurance - Exclusion of Risk Clause - Recovery
Plaintiffs who are beneficiaries of a life insurance policy brought suit
against the defendant insurer who refused to pay the proceeds of the
policy. Plaintiff's decedent was a pilot on a routine training flight for the
Florida Air National Guard when his aircraft went into an uncontrollable
spin and he was forced to bail out over the Atlantic Ocean. Sometime
during descent or after entering the water the pilot became entangled in
the shroud lines of his parachute and in the attempt to free himself caused
his life preserver to move from its normal position to a position which
caused him extreme difficulty in raising his head above the surface of the
water, which difficulty resulted in his drowning. The insurance policy had
a provision which excluded recovery if death was the result "from travel
or flight in, or descent from or with, any kind of aircraft aboard which
the insured is a pilot or member of the crew."1 Held, Affirmed: The pilot's
death resulted from the risk of flight which was excluded by the aviation
exclusion clause of his insurance policy. Elliott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,644 (5th Cir. 1968).
The trial court in the present case interpreted the exclusion clause as
excluding recovery for death resulting from an aircraft flight. The court
here said that the pilot's death "was not an independent cause but a link
in the unbroken chain of causation."' Recovery under an insurance policy
with a clause to exclude the risk of aviation has been wide and varied,
since most of them appear to rest on the wording of the clause in relation
to the facts of a particular situation. One case has held that the insurance
company must prove that death resulted from an aviation hazard and
where it failed to disprove that the death resulted from causes other than
aviation, the insured was allowed to recover.! Another case has allowed
recovery where the death of the insured could not be connected with the
flight of the aircraft other than carrying him to the place where his death
resulted,' and still another allowed recovery when it was shown that the
death was not connected directly or indirectly with the deceased's flight in
the aircraft.' In Hobbs v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., it was held that if death
results from an injury sustained due to the deceased having "been in or
on a vehicle or device for aerial navigation" that he could not recover.
Elliott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Av. Cas. 5J 17,644 (5th Cit. 1968).
2 10 Av. Cas. at 5 17,648.
'Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 193 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1951), reh. denied, 194
F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1952).
'Bull v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 141 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1944).
'McDaniel v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 221 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1955).
EHobbs v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 253 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1958).
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As demonstrated by this sample of decisions, no set rules can be laid down
to determine recovery when an insurance policy contains a clause excluding
the aviation risk.
L.R.J., Jr.
Torts - Slip and Fall - Contributory Negligence
Plaintiff went to Kennedy International Airport to see her husband
off and was caught in an unruly crowd in which "there was a great deal
of pushing and shoving." Because she read no English, she disregarded a
warning sign on a door leading to a stairway to the flight field; on the
stairway she was knocked down by the crowd and sustained personal in-
juries. Contending that she was an invitee and not a trespasser, she sued
the Port of New York Authority. Held, Complaint dismissed: Plaintiff
failed to sustain her burden of proving that she was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence. Varadi v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 10 Av. Cas.
17,669 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1968).
The defendants may rely on testimony other than that of the plaintiff
herself to show that she was guilty of negligence proximately contributing
to the accident. Here, the evidence showed that the "pushing and shoving"
was continuous, that plaintiff's daughter recognized it as a "dangerous
situation," and that plaintiff was on the outside of the crowd. Because she
chose not to take advantage of her opportunity to escape from the mob,
she was guilty of contributory negligence.
D.M.E.
Torts - Airport Authority - Independent Corporate Entity
An action was brought for personal injuries, sustained on 28 May 1965
in the crash of a private aircraft, against the City of Imperial, Nebraska
and the operator of the airport authority for the alleged commission of
negligent acts. Defendant City of Imperial answered that on 11 April
1960, under the authorization of the Cities Airport Authorities Act,' the
city created the Airport Authority, which was vested with the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction and authority over the airport and its operation and
maintenance. The motion for summary judgment of the City of Imperial
was sustained and plaintiff's petition dismissed. Held, Aflirmed: "[A]n
airport authority, duly created by a city under the Cities Airport Authori-
ties Act, is a supplementary, separate, and independent public corporation,
and the parent municipal corporation is not liable for the torts of the
authority." Lock v. City of Imperial, 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,691 (Neb. S. Ct.
1968).
'NEB. R.R.S. § 3-501, et. seq. (1943).
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The Cities Airport Authorities Act provides that the authority is de-
signed "a body corporate and politic constituting a public corporation and
an agency of the city for which such board is established."' Such an
Airport Authority has the power, among other things, to sue and be sued,
have a seal and alter the same at pleasure, make bylaws for the manage-
ment and regulation of affairs, issue bonds and levy taxes, contract with
the creating city or any other political subdivision of the state and appoint
officers and agents. Despite such apparent independence, plaintiff asserted
that the authority was merely an agent of the city in the same sense as a
municipal department, commission or board and that it was not merely
an agency of the city but its controlled agent to the extent that the cor-
porate veil and separate entity may be disregarded entirely as though the
authority were simply the alter ego of the city.
In determining whether the state legislature intended to vest the normal
corporate attributes and consequent limited liability of a creator in the city,
the court examined the applicable legislation and concluded, "In no way
does the act indicate any intention to disregard the corporate entity of an
airport authority nor to constitute the supplementary public corporation an
agent of the city for purposes of tort liability attribution."3 Commenting
on a governmental organization of similar structure, Roscoe Pound, in
1902, stated the principle upon which the instant decision is based. "As the
Board was the creature of the statute, and exercised powers derived from
the state, not from the city, we do not see how it can be said to represent
the municipality so as to make the latter liable for its wrongful acts.'"
M.E.D. Jr.
Inverse Condemnation - Damaging -
Insufficient Cause of Action
In 1947, the plaintiff property owner purchased property adjacent to
the defendant city's airport. Due to several extensions subsequent to this
purchase, the runway now runs within several hundred feet of the plaintiff's
house and the taxi apron for this runway is just opposite the house. The
plaintiff suffered damage to her home having over twenty window panes
broken by noise vibrations caused by aircraft warming up prior to take off.
Plaintiffs also alleged that sleeping and conversation were impossible and
that life in the house was unbearable. The defendant city argued that there
were no direct overflights above the plaintiff's property and that there
could not be a "taking" of the property otherwise. Therefore, the city
demurred, stating that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in
inverse condemnation. The trial court dismissed the demurrer to which
2NEB. R.R.S. SS 3-501-514 (1943).
3 10 Av. Cas. at 5 17,692.
"Murray v. City of Omaha, 66 Neb. 279, 92 N.W. 299 (1902).
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the city properly excepted and this appeal resulted on the question of
whether or not the property owner had alleged a cause of action sufficient
for a "taking" of property by inverse condemnation. Held, overruled
and remanded: The property owner failed to state a cause of action in
inverse condemnation for want of any claim for overflights, but a suffic-
ient cause of action in nuisance was alleged in the plaintiff's writ and the
case is to be remanded to be decided upon this ground. Ferguson v. City
of Kenne, 238 A.2d 1 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1968) (10 Av. Cas. 5 17,715).
The court considered the applicability of the inverse condemnation
theory to the present situation and decided for several reasons that it was
inapplicable. Foremost among these was the fact that no direct over-
flight occurred over the plaintiff's property and therefore the air space
was not taken. A number of United States Supreme Court decisions1
were analyzed and compared to decisions rendered by state courts, which
had granted relief to property owners in similar circumstances. The court
reasoned that, like the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment in the Willow River case, the New Hampshire Constitution limited
it in granting relief to a "taking" of property, and "damaging" or "inter-
ference with the use" of such property did not constitute a "taking."
The Martin case was distinguished on the ground that the Washington
Constitution allowed recovery for either "taking" or "damaging." The
court pointed out that in the only case in the federal courts to consider
the instant issue, Batten v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit denied re-
covery because no overflights were made. Though the property owner was
denied a recovery on the basis of a constitutional taking, the court found
that her writ substantially set forth a cause of action based on nuisance
and remanded on this point.
This unduly restrictive approach is attacked in a strong dissent wherein
it is pointed out that precedent exists for allowing a recovery for a "taking"
of property though no actual physical interjection is made upon the
property.4 The reliance by the court upon the Willow River case (which
involved interference with an "economic use" rather than a "domestic
use") and the ,Batten case (where no actual damage was done to the
property, only windows were shaken and smoke blown across the premises,
as opposed to twenty window panes being broken and sleep being rendered
impossible in the present case) seems to be an overly conservative ap-
proach to the question in light of the Eaton precedent, set by this very
court, and the standard of logic and fairness espoused by the Supreme
Court in Causby.
E.G.S.
1Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1944).
2Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1964); Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1962).
n306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). In this case the nearest the runway ran to the property
owner's house was 650 feet and most of the warmups occurred over 2000 feet from the house.
In the present case the warmups were directly opposite and within several hundred feet of the
plaintiff's home.
4Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 3 Shirley (1872).
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Torts - Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Intrastate Flights Applicability
Suit was instituted by the Administrator of the estates of decedents
who were killed in an airplane crash. The defendant owned an aircraft
which had been rented to a duly licensed student pilot who, on the day
of the crash, flew to a ranch in Texas where he picked up three passengers,
although a licensed student pilot is not permitted to carry passengers.
The four flew to another city in Texas, remained for a time, and took
off again in the airplane which subsequently crashed. All were killed.
The parties stipulated to the following facts: the Administrator was a
citizen of New Mexico; the defendant was a resident of Texas; that the
suit was brought under the Texas Death Statute; that the amount in-
volved exceeded $10,000; that the pilot picked up the passengers without
the owner's knowledge or consent; that the owner was not negligent in
leasing the aircraft; and that the aircraft was in all respects airworthy.
Plaintiff contended that the negligence of the student pilot should be
imputed to the defendant because of Sec. 1301 (26) of the U. S. Code.
The defendant contended that the Texas Aeronautics Act, which defines
"operation of aircraft" differently from the Federal Act, should be applic-
able.1 Held: The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 applies to intrastate flights
and the owner of a rented aircraft operated on an intrastate flight is
engaged in the operation of an aircraft within the meaning of the Act.
Sosa v. Young Flying Serv., 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,671 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
In holding that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 applied to intrastate
flights, the court was of the opinion that, as the owner provision of the
Texas statute had been taken out, one could conclude that the Texas statute
was merely silent on the point of ownership liability, and that the state
statute does not say that the owner shall not be liable. In fact, the court
concluded, the state statute as it now reads shows a legislative intent to
coordinate with the federal statute.
The court also reasoned that a Fifth Circuit case, Hays v. Morgan,2
was authority for the instant decision. As the Hays court did not expressly
find the federal statute exempting the liability of security owners in air-
craft inapplicable because of the intrastate character of the flight, but
based its decision on another point, the instant court's position was that
"Operation of Aircraft" is defined in 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (26) (1964) as follows:
"Operation of aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means the use of aircraft, for the
purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation of aircraft. Any person who
causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of
legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft shall
be deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of this
chapter.
The Texas Aeronautics Act defines, TEx. Civ. STAT. ANNOT. art. 46c-1 (1925), "operation of
aircraft" as follows:
"Operation of Aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means flight and use of aircraft for
the purpose of air navigation, and includes the navigation or piloting of aircraft.
The Texas statute read at one time exactly like the federal statute. The "owner is engaged in
the operation of aircraft" provision was deleted from the Texas statute by the state legislature
in 1961.
a221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
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the Fifth Circuit had held the Federal Act applicable. However, it does
seem possible that the Fifth Circuit opinion followed the well-known
custom of federal courts, viz., not deciding a federal question if the de-
cision can be reached on another point.
The Sosa plaintiff and court refer to the liability of the owner as abso-
lute liability. Surely this statement can be taken to mean that the owner
will be fully liable to the extent of the damages cause by the proven
negligence of the pilot and does not mean liability without proof of
fault, the latter usually being the meaning ascribed to the term. The
parties were given leave by the court to file an immediate appeal.
J.T.W.
Air Carrier - Acquistion - Antitrust Immunity
Butler Aviation Company petitioned for review of an order under Sec.
408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,1 approving the acquisition by
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (EAL) of all the stock of Remmert-Werner, Inc.
(R-W) through issuance of its own stock. EAL and R-W intervened in
support of the order. R-W is sales agent for an executive jet aircraft.
The Civil Aeronautics Board had permitted the Examiner's initial decision
to become effective without review and the Examiner declined to attach
a condition, proposed by the Board's Bureau of Operating Rights, sup-
ported by Butler and accepted by EAL, that EAL should not claim anti-
trust immunity under Sec. 414 of the Act outside the field of transporta-
tion. Held, petition denied: An air carrier's acquisition of a fixed base
operator that was also a sales agent for executive jet aircraft, while out-
side the field of air transportation, is within the antitrust immunity con-
ferred by Sec. 414 of the Act, even though the immunity was not sought
by the air carrier. Butler Aviation Co. v. CAB, 10 Av. Cas. 5 17,699 (2d
Cir. 1968).
Section 408 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 includes acquisi-
tions by air carriers of persons "engaged in any phase of aeronautics other-
wise than as an air carrier." Section 408 (b) contains a proviso prohibiting
approval of any transaction "which would result in creating a monopoly
or would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain
competition or jeopardize another carrier not a party . . . ." to the trans-
action. Though the proviso's mandate is sharp, the Board has escaped the
straitjacket that would have been imposed by reading the proviso as a
limit on its consideration of competition in passing on applications under
Sec. 408, by concluding, in light of the immunity from the antitrust laws
conferred by Sec. 414, that it must consider anti-competitive effects less
extreme than those outlined in the proviso in determining whether the
1 72 Stat. 767, as amended, 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C. S 1378 (1964).
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transaction will "be consistent with the public interest" as defined in
Sec. 102. The true construction of Sec. 408(b) as to transactions with
anti-competitive effects is that the Board cannot approve a transaction
if its effects will be so extreme as to violate the proviso but must approve
others if, but only if, it finds the disadvantage of any curtailment of
competition to be outweighed by "the advantages of improved service."'
In the instant case, denying the petition to review, the court used lan-
guage confessing surprise at the Board's having declined review of the
Examiner's initial decision, but reasoned that, literally, Sec. 414 is manda-
tory; that section states than any person affected by an order under Sec.
408 "shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust
laws' ,... insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything
authorized, approved, or required by such order." Although one may
readily agree that a person seeking approval under Sec. 408 is entitled to
insist that the Board must accord the full benefits Congress directed if
he meets the statutory tests, EAL did not so insist. The Examiner's state-
ment "that the Board cannot require Eastern to waive the antitrust im-
munity conferred by Section 414," which at first blush may seem peculiar
in that the Board should be required to thrust on EAL antitrust immunity
it was willing not to achieve-especially in a field peripheral to the Board's
primary concerns, was held by the court to reach the right result. The
court read Sec. 414 and similar provisions in other statutes, such as Sec.
5 (11 ) of the Interstate Commerce Act and Sec. 1S of the Shipping Act,3
as declaring that in the areas there delineated the public interest demands
that if a transaction has survived examination by the appropriate regula-
tory agency, antitrust peace shall prevail even if a party is willing to settle
for less. A further reason for such a reading is that Congress-had it con-
sidered the matter-might well have wished to guard agencies against a
subconscious temptation to neglect thorough assessment of anti-competitive
considerations on the basis that the transaction would remain open to
later attack by the Attorney General or in a private suit-remedies too
slow and doubtful in these areas of particular public concern.
As said in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,4 "It
would be odd to conclude that an affiliation between a common carrier
and an air carrier that passed muster under § 408 should run afoul of
the antitrust laws. Whether or not transactions of that character meet
the standards of competition and monopoly provided by the Act is pe-
culiarly a question for the Board, subject of course to judicial review as
provided in 49 U.S.C. § 1486."
L. E. L.
Air Carriers, - Free Passes - Liability Release
The plaintiff's husband is an employee of National Airlines. She was
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
'See also final paragraph of Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act; But see, California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482 (1962).
4371 U.S. 296, 309 (1963).
[Vol. 34
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
riding with her three children on a free trip pass obtained from Northwest
Airlines, although she had paid $45 to the airline. The plaintiff alleged that
while she was on the aircraft she and her children were injured due to the
negligence of the airline and further contended that the $45 service charge
payment took her out of the class of gratuitous licensee and, in addition,
that she had not signed the trip pass. Held: The plaintiff was a gratuitous
licensee, to whom the carrier only owes the duty not to willfully or
wantonly injure; hence the carrier was not liable. Sims v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
The court held that the subject of free passes in interstate transporta-
tion is governed by federal law and statements contained in such free
passes absolving the carrier from liability for ordinary negligence are
valid. Frances v. Southern Pac. R.R.' applied this rule to railroads; Braugh-
ton v. United Air Lines, Inc.' applied the holding of Frances to airlines.
By the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress has pre-empted the field
relating to airline passes; their effect is determined by federal, to the ex-
clusion of state, law.
The Sims case is very similar to Braughton, where the Federal Court
stated:
In the absence of facts establishing gross or wanton negligence on the part
of [the airline] . . . there can be no question but that the "conditions of
contract" under which . . . a pass was issued to Mrs. Braughton exonerate
[the airline] . . . from liability for any ordinary negligence claim alleged by
plaintiff. ... '
The court went on to analogize the $45 paid by plaintiff to the $9
paid by Mrs. Braughton and here, as in Braughton, found that the pay-
ment of a service charge did not make the pass anything other than a
gratuitous one. So the only duty owed by the airline was not to willfully
or wantonly injure plaintiff and her family while they were occupants of
its airplane.
The argument that plaintiff did not sign the trip pass was discounted
by the court in another railroad case analogy.' The court concluded that
the failure of the passenger to sign the pass is immaterial when the pass
is accepted and used.
F.J.C.
Carrier Liability - Judgment N.O.V.
Statutory Negligence
Action was brought for the death of two passengers who had hired an
air-taxi owned and operated by defendants in Pennsylvania. The plane,
'333 U.S. 445 (1948).
2189 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Mo. 1960).
a 189 F. Supp. at 141.
"Quimby v. Boston & M. R. R., 23 N.E. 205 (Mass. S. Ct. 1890).
1968]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
which was not equipped for instrument flying under the applicable federal
aviation rules, picked up the decedents at Washington National Airport
but was unable to land at the passengers' intended destination because the
field was closed by adverse weather conditions. The pilot then reported
he was returning with his passengers to Pennsylvania where the visibility
was also below minimum. The plane crashed shortly thereafter, while fly-
ing in zero visibility, into the side of Bald Eagle Mountain some 440 off
course. Plaintiffs alleged pilot negligence for the violation of several applic-
able FAA regulations and the "highest standard of care" owed by a com-
mon carrier to its passengers. The defendant's evidence, mainly expert
testimony, to dispute liability was fragmentary and speculative, yet by
the Pennsylvania "oral testimony" rule the judge allowed the case to go
to the jury and a verdict was returned for the defendants. On motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Held, motion granted: Where
a pilot of an air-taxi knew mountain territory well but crashed while the
plane was in a condition of sustained level flight below minimum altitude
levels required in a snowstorm so that the pilot was blinded, the pilot
violated Federal Aviation Agency regulations pertaining to minimum
flight altitude and such violation was negligence as a matter of law and
was the proximate cause of the death of the passengers. Gatenby v. Altoona
Av. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 599 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
The court found that the consideration of plaintiffs' motion for Judg-
ment N.O.V. is to be governed by the federal standards which provide
that the court shall direct a verdict in favor of the party having the
burden of proof, if the evidence established the facts in his favor so clearly
that reasonable men could entertain no doubt with regard thereto! It
dismissed the Pennsylvania "oral evidence" rule, whereby it is the province
of the jury in trespass cases, where oral testimony is concerned, to pass
upon the credibility of witnesses, as a procedural rule confined in its appli-
cation to cases where the evidence comes solely or largely from the oral
testimony of an interested witness, the plaintiff himself. The purpose of
the rule is to guide the trial court in determining whether there is an
issue of fact to submit to the jury. The issue is credibility of the witness
and where the issue is lacking, as where there is no reason to doubt his
candor, then the reason for the rule falls. In the present case, no interested
witness testified for the plaintiffs on the liability question; they were all
dead. Testimony was all from independent witnesses, largely recounting
physical facts, the existence of which was not disputed. The court con-
cluded that it was not bound, under the Erie rule, to submit the issue of
liability to a jury solely because of the "oral testimony" rule, if the evi-
dence is otherwise conclusive.
In passing on plaintiffs' motion, the standard was applied that the evi-
dence must be so overwhelming that once the fact in issue becomes infer-
able any other equally strong inferences are impossible." Flying an aircraft
'Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Herron v. Southern Pac. R.R.,
283 U.S. 91 (1931).
2 Mihalchak v. American Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir. 1959).
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unequipped with deicing equipment into adverse weather conditions was
found to be a violation of FAA regulations but there was no clear evidence
that icing conditions were the cause of the crash. The Minimum Flight
Altitude Rules' for day VFR flight were violated and because this statutory
minimum standard of conduct was enacted for the purpose of avoiding
the particular harm that ensued, the causal relationship of proximate
cause was established.4 The intent of these minimum flight rules is to pre-
vent an airplane from crashing into obstacles in its line of flight; thus,
violation of the altitude regulation was negligence as a matter of law and
the legal cause of the resulting crash. Because the defendant was unable to
controvert the physical evidence in this case, the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was granted.
W.O.W.
' 14 C.F.R. §§ 75, 91.175 (1967). "Minimum flight altitude rules: Except during take off
and landing, the flight altitude rules prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section . . .
shall govern air carrier operations ...
(a) Day VFR operation. No aircraft shall be flown at an altitude less than 500 feet above the
surface or less than 1,000 feet from any mountain, hill, or other obstruction to flight.
(b) Night VFR or IFR operation. No aircraft shall be flown at an altitude less than 1,000
feet above the highest obstacle located within a horizontal distance of 5 miles from the
center of the course intendent to be flown ....
4 38 AM. Jue. Negligence S 160 (1938). "The statute itself charges one that its violation will
result in an injury of the character sought to be prevented in its enactment. A statute having
for its purpose the preservation of life and minimizing of personal injuries may impose a duty
which is greater than the duty of ordinary care as such duty exists at common law, but a person
who is charged by the statute with the necessity of exercising increased diligence must perform
such duty or bear the consequences of his neglect."
